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A CASE FOR FAIRNESS IN PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTING
Gene Ming Lee*
INTRODUCTION
Public works' provide the infrastructure that enables our country to
prosper and grow. Billions of tax dollars are spent each year by our
federal, state, and municipal governments on roads, bridges, buildings,
and utilities. These expenditures comprise a major sector of the con-
struction industry.2 Like private developers, government entities hire
private businesses to provide the labor, materials, and services re-
quired to produce complex construction projects. Procurement of
public works involves a conscious effort by contracting officials to as-
sure that the taxpayer's interests are being looked after. Although
taxpayers do not expect those who do business with the government
to work for free, there is an expectation that business will be under-
taken fairly.
Unlike the private sector, the actions of governmental agencies are
subject to public scrutiny.3 Billions of dollars in tax revenue are at
stake and the public demands assurances that its money is being spent
reasonably. Assuming that funds are properly allocated to necessary
projects, the remaining public interest lies in the award process and
the construction process. Government agents who award contracts
should not personally benefit from the award process; contractors who
bid on contracts must do so without collusion; and, those who are
awarded contracts must perform as promised. These criteria embody
the most obvious aspects of procurement fairness.
Fairness in public works construction implicates other concerns
that, although less headline worthy, are nonetheless vital to maintain-
ing the integrity of the bidding process.' Construction is a complex
undertaking in which participants must deal with a multitude of
unknowns. It is a process that involves the evolution of an idea to a
* The author has been a practicing architect for the past fifteen years.
1. For the purposes of this Note, "public works" are construction projects initi-
ated and financed by government.
2. In 1994, $129.1 billion was spent on government construction, accounting for
more than 25% of the $500 billion spent on construction overall. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, 725 (1995). From 1990 to
1992, the construction industry accounted for 4% of the Gross Domestic Product of
the United States. I& at 452.
3. Public scrutiny of government procurement has been intensified following a
number of scandals involving corruption. New York City and New York State re-
sponded to this problem by appointing the New York State Commission on Govern-
ment Integrity to look into ways of improving laws to prevent corruption, favoritism,
and abuse. John D. Feerick, Reflections on Chairing the Commission on Government
Integrity, in Government Ethics Reform for the 1990s 1 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991)
[hereinafter Ethics Reform].
4. Among these concerns is the ability to attract bids. Id. at 470-71.
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graphical and written representation, which then must be ultimately
transformed into to a physical reality.' At various points along the
way, theory may collide with reality, resulting in conflict.6 How these
conflicts are handled is crucial to the timing and cost of construction.
It immediately affects the allocation of costs between the parties. In
the long term, how fairly this is done may affect the number of willing
participants in the process. Federal, state, and municipal governmen-
tal agencies that contract for construction create their own rules for
dealing with these conflicts.7 This Note examines these rules, dis-
cusses their inequities, and makes the case for reform.
Part I discusses the general process of construction, presenting an
overview of its component parts from design to documentation, from
bidding to award, and through the act of construction itself. Part II
focuses on the special case of public works construction. This part
discusses how and why public works differs from private construction.
Part III looks at dispute resolution and how different governmental
entities have addressed this issue. This part also discusses the short-
comings of these models in achieving fairness. Finally, part IV pro-
poses changes in the way public works are bid in order to minimize
potential disputes and the way that actual disputes between the par-
ties are settled in an attempt to be fair. The proposed changes will
ultimately create a contracting system that will encourage participa-
tion and increase competition.
I. THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION
Building is an inherently complex process that involves directing the
efforts of many people to create a given result. Conceptually, it may
be divided into two major phases: design and construction.8 The de-
sign phase includes planning, preparation, and definition of the work
to be executed during the construction phase. At the juncture be-
tween the design and construction is the process of bidding and award.
In order to understand the particular problems of public works con-
tracting, it is useful to first gain a general understanding of these
phases of construction.
This part looks at the overall considerations that must be addressed
through the phases of a project, using the terminology and definitions
embodied in the standard form contract documents of the American
Institute of Architects ("AIA"). 9 These documents, taken as a whole,
5. See infra part I.B (discussing the design of a project). In the design phase, the
architect and engineer prepare construction drawings and written specifications that
serve as the basis of a contractor's bid.
6. See infra part I.D (discussing problems that arise during construction).
7. See infra part III.
8. See Edmond Pachner, Architectural Contract Administration 3-4 (1992).
9. Many construction contracts are based on standard form contracts prepared
by the AIA. The AIA is an organization that focuses on issues related to the architec-
1076 [Vol. 65
1996] FAIRNESS IN PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTING 1077
essentially embody the working relationships within the construction
industry. This section then chronologically discusses the phases of a
project, from design, to the selection of a contractor, and through the
actual construction process. This discussion demonstrates how deci-
sions made in the preliminary phases of design affect the construction.
A. Balancing Priorities-Money, Time, and Quality
In any construction project, many variables must be balanced.
There is the hard dollar cost for the bricks and mortar;, there is the
time it takes to achieve a particular result; and there is the value or
quality associated with the final product. These are often competing
interests. A low construction cost may come at the sacrifice of quality.
Accelerating a schedule may result in an earlier completion, but at a
higher cost or lower quality. Seeking better quality may mean a
longer construction time and a higher cost. All construction projects
must contend with these conflicting interests.
1. Money Priorities
Dollar costs are obviously a major factor in construction. A client
may have a limited budget, and be unable to proceed if it is exceeded.
Accordingly, the project budget and the manner in which it is allo-
cated will affect many aspects of the project. For example, the fee
paid to the architect may affect the quality of the documents that will
be used to solicit bids from contractors. Presumably, an architect paid
a low fee' 0 will only invest limited hours on the design and documen-
tation of the project, a fact that may result in an inferior work prod-
tural profession and whose members are registered architects. Standard contracts
have been drafted by the AIA since 1888, when it prepared a "Uniform Contract" in
conjunction with the National Association of Builders. The first edition of the AIA's
standard documents was prepared in 1911. Since then, the AIA has periodically up-
dated the standard documents. For example, AA Document B141, Standard Form of
Agreement Between Owner and Architect (14th ed. 1987) is in its fourteenth edition.
For a discussion of the early history of the AIA standard documents, see William S.
Parker & Faneuil Adams, The A.I.A. Standard Contract Forms and the Law 135-36
(1954).
AIA contracts embody the written agreements between the owner and architect,
architect and subconsultants, and owner and contractor. In addition, construction
typically incorporate related documents such as the drawings, specifications, general
conditions (describing the relationship between the parties and their responsibilities),
supplementary general conditions (amending the general conditions to the specifics of
the project), and addenda (modifications issued subsequent to issuing the basic con-
tract documents, but prior to the bid itself). Keith Collier, Construction Contracts 9
(2d ed. 1987).
10. According to two recent studies by the Professional Services Management
Journal, 92% of architects said that price competition is growing. At the same time,
the cost of running an office is increasing. Architects in an Economic Vise, Progressive
Architecture, June 1995, at 50.
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uct.11 If the project documents are poor, the contractor's bid may not
reflect the true cost of the project because there will be unforeseen
changes or additions to the project's scope. Unlike the bid of a pro-
ject, a modification made after the award of a contract cannot be com-
petitively bid.' 2 Contractual modifications, commonly referred to as
change orders,' 3 are likely to lead to increases in cost, as well as to
disagreements between the owner and contractor. Therefore, low fees
paid up front to the architect may lead to higher costs through later
change orders.
Further, the need to limit costs may influence an owner's approach
towards the construction process. If there is a hard budget for a pro-
ject, an owner must find ways to lock-in costs and minimize the risk of
cost overruns. The owner may employ several methods to avoid the
risk of increasing costs. A single contract can be made with an entity
for the complete design and construction of a project with a design-
build team.' 4 Alternatively, an owner may agree to freeze the costs of
a project by obtaining a guaranteed maximum price from a contractor
even before the design documents have been fully completed. 15 Also,
a construction contract may be written to require a contractor to as-
sume the risk of uncertain conditions. 6 In each of these scenarios, the
owner can maintain a specific project cost, but inevitably sacrifices
some control over the quality of the final product.
11. Robert A. Rubin, Scope-of-Work Disputes, in Construction Litigation 205
(Kenneth M. Cushman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993) (noting that a failure to invest ade-
quate time and resources results in poor drawings).
12. See infra part I.D.
13. A change order is a written agreement that is prepared by the architect and
signed by the architect, owner, and contractor modifying the work of the contract,
contract sum, and/or the time of performance. AIA Document A201, General Condi-
tions of the Contract for Construction, 7.2.1 (14th ed. 1987) [hereinafter AIA Doc.
A201].
14. A builder may also provide a lump sum price for the design and construction
of a project under a design-build model. In such a scenario, the architect works for
the contractor rather than the owner. The use of design-build in public works, how-
ever, is restricted. Only 27 states have statutes which expressly permit design-build in
public works. See William G. Krizan, Design-Build Faces Legal Hurdle, Engineering
News-Record, Aug. 12, 1996, at 17.
15. A guaranteed maximum price agreement is made between an owner and con-
struction manager, who in turn contracts with the individual building trades. The con-
struction manager agrees to the price when the drawings are only sixty percent to
eighty percent complete. Andrew M. Civitello, Jr., Contractor's Guide to Change Or-
ders 14-15 (1987).
16. From a contractor's point of view, the assumption of risk should be offset by
the potential for profit. Keith Collier, Estimating Construction Costs: A Conceptual
Approach 34 (1984).
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2. Time Priorities
Tune is an important factor in all phases of a construction project.' 7
The longer it takes to produce a project, the longer the construction
need remains unfulfilled. Accordingly, competitors working on simi-
lar projects will race to be the first on the market to satisfy demand
and slower firms will lose out. Additionally, delays mean that income
with which the project is to be financed does not flow in. Thus, the
viability of a project may depend upon its swift completion.
The time focus exists at every phase of a project. Maintaining
schedules to keep the project on track can lead to errors that are
costly at later stages. For example, hastily made decisions during the
design phase may result in costly changes later during construction.
Design documents which are rushed to meet a deadline can be fraught
with errors in coordination or ambiguity, making it more difficult for a
contractor to obtain a reliable bid.18 In extreme cases, an owner may
seek to reduce development time by choosing to commence construc-
tion of a foundation before the building design is completed.19
When a project falls behind schedule, the owner must contend with
the consequences of delays. Delays in one area of construction may
impact on the schedule of other areas. This, in turn, may affect the
amount of labor required for a task, as well as the cost of labor and
materials. A delay may impact costs and the ultimate completion
date of a project.2' Who bears these added costs will depend upon
who caused the delay and how the construction contract assigns the
risk of such delay.'
17. See AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, art. 8 (discussing rules regarding timeliness
of project progress and completion, as well as obtaining an extension thereof). The
key dates specified in a construction contract are the date of commencement of the
Work and the date of Substantial Completion of the Work. The latter is certified by
the architect based solely on her determination. It is particularly critical because it is
a condition precedent for the owner's release of retainage; money contractually held
back from the contractor to ensure that the work will be completed. Id. 9.8; see also
Frank R. Dagostino, Estimating in Building Construction 156 (3d ed. 1989).
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19. Accelerated and overlapping construction phases are used in "fast track" con-
struction. Robert Allan Class et al., Current Techniques in Architectural Practice 19
(1970). It is particularly popular in times of high inflation. Id. at 21-22.
20. As a result of delays caused by the owner, a contractor is likely to file a claim
for damages. See Justin Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering, and the
Construction Process § 30.10, at 692-94 (3d ed. 1985).
21. A contractor may also seek an extension in time as a result of an owner-caused
delay. Id. at 692.
22. An owner may seek to eliminate damages or limit the remedy for an owner-
caused delay to an extension of time through the use of a no-damage clause. Id. at
692-94.
For a discussion of other risks assigned to the contractor, see infra part ILC.2.
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3. Quality Priorities
Quality on a construction project can mean many things. Some as-
pects of quality are outwardly visible. On a building project, for ex-
ample, quality may reflect the distinctiveness of a design or how
successful the building meets the client's needs. Other aspects of
quality, such as a building system's long-term durability, are hidden.
The type and importance of quality will vary from project to project.
For example, the design for a warehouse in an industrial area of town
may require inexpensive materials that can be erected quickly and ef-
ficiently. In contrast, however, a new courthouse, important to the
revitalization of the downtown area, will dictate a look and feel of
permanence that comes from a particular design imagery requiring
heavy building materials.
Where specific attributes are important, the design documents must
spell them out in great detail.23 A building housing a high-tech
supercomputer will require precise electrical and mechanical systems
in order to insure an environment in which computers can reliably
function. On the other hand, it may not matter in a minor demolition
project whether the work is done by explosives or by physical labor,
just as long as the result is achieved at minimal cost. There may be
many ways to do a job and the specifics must be communicated be-
tween the designer and contractor.
Trade-offs between these variables are inevitable and may shift
through the course of a project because the construction process is a
dynamic one with constantly changing parameters. To the extent pos-
sible, however, these trade-offs must be made from the start, because
the further a project progresses, the more complex the changes be-
come and the more difficult with which they are to deal.
B. The Design Phase
A project begins when an owner defines a construction need and
hires an architect.2 4 The architect acts as the representative of the
owner in dealing with governmental regulators such as building de-
partments, zoning commissions, and the like. The relationship is typi-
cally contractual, spelling out the terms of engagement, including fees,
retainers, and responsibilities. 5 As the leader of the design phase, the
23. An owner, for example, may specify that the pipe used in a building be of a
particular manufacture. Such was the scenario in the famous case of Jacobs &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), authored by Judge Cardozo.
24. The practice of architecture and the practice of engineering are licensed at the
state level. See Sweet, supra note 20, §§ 13.01-13.08, at 204-31.
25. The typical owner-architect agreement is embodied by AIA Document B141,
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect (14th ed. 1987) [herein-
after AIA Doc. B141].
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architect will assemble a design team.26 This team will include engi-
neers and other professionals that will program, plan, and design a
building. In most cases, the architect will have a contract with the
owner and the other professionals will be subconsultants paid through
the architect. Professional fees are typically set prior to the start of
work and most often established as a lump sum.27
Design is a highly collaborative effort that involves a team of spe-
cialists representing many disciplines.' Under the overall direction of
the architect, the design team will review client needs, applicable
codes, and other restrictions in order to achieve a design that meets
the client's objectives. Multiple phases of study take the design
through increasing levels of specificity, each stage building upon the
basic decisions made during the preceding phase.' It is a process that
looks at problems on a general level and gradually reduces them to
the specific. All of this happens against a backdrop of a schedule and
a budget.30
The architect's basic services are broken down into different phases.
In the Schematic Design, the architect takes a functional space pro-
26. Although this Note focuses on the traditional model of construction, there are
many present day variations. For example, an owner may hire a construction man-
ager even before the start of construction in order to make use of particular construc-
tion expertise during the design process. See AIA Document B801/CMa, Standard
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager (1992). The con-
struction manager will review the program, prepare project schedules, prepare cost
estimates, and assist in the administration of the construction contract. Id. arts. 2-3.
Although the use of construction managers is now common for large construction
projects, it does not substantially change the owner-architect and owner-contractor
relationships, as the owner will typically retain privity of contract with these parties.
See Dagostino, supra note 17, at 46. Therefore, this Note will not further mention
construction managers. See also supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing de-
sign-build).
27. According to a Professional Services Management Journal survey on design
fees, the most popular type of fee for architectural services is lump sum. Lump sum
fees comprise 40% of contracts. Fees Improved," Fee Bidding Down, Architectural
Record, May 1996, at 33.
Under the standard AIA contract, fees are broken down into Basic Services, Addi-
tional Services and Reimbursable Expenses. Basic Services are usually fixed at a stip-
ulated sum. Additional Services may be provided at a lump sum or timecard basis.
Reimbursable Expenses are provided at a multiple of cost. AIA Doc. B141, supra
note 25, art. 11 (Basis of Compensation).
In a novel approach to professional compensation, one design-build team recently
tied part of its compensation to the satisfaction of the building's users. See William G.
Krizan, A Lab Cooks Up New Incentives, Engineering News-Record, Aug. 19, 1996 at
14.
28. Design of a building of any size takes the efforts of dozens of architects and
engineers. Pachner, supra note 8, at 3. Adding hundreds of construction workers and
millions of construction items makes for the inevitability of errors and omissions by
the architect and engineer. Id.
29. See AIA Doc. B141, supra note 25, art. 2.
30. See supra part I.A.
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gram 31 and considers alternative approaches to the project's design. 2
Working with the client, the architect will evaluate the alternatives
and select a direction for further development. The architect fixes and
describes building systems and materials used in the project during
Design Development.33
The design phase culminates in the production of construction doc-
uments, which contain the drawings and specifications that detail the
particulars of the project's construction.34 Specific construction meth-
ods and materials will be spelled out in carefully drafted, scale draw-
ings and detailed specifications. These design documents may not
spell out every single condition found within a building, but they are
meant to describe to another party the designer's intent.3 5 The docu-
ments spell out specific sizes, conditions, products, and construction
methods in order to establish the design as well as the level of quality
ultimately achieved. In many areas, the specifics of the design must
be completed by the contractor's fabricator and a shop drawing pre-
pared for review by the architect in order to establish compliance with
intent of the design.36
C. Bidding and Award
The objective of the Bidding or Negotiation phase 37 is to hire a re-
sponsible contractor to lead the construction phase of the project for a
reasonable price. During this phase, the architect assists the owner in
obtaining bids and awarding the construction contract. The contractor
must review the design documents in order to establish his bid. To
facilitate the creation of bids, copies of the design documents and doc-
uments describing the working relationship of the parties are fur-
nished for the review of prospective contractors.
31. A space program is a listing of the rooms or functional elements required and
their sizes. While the space program may be generated by the owner, a program will
often be developed by the architect before the start of design of the project through
discussions with the owner. See Bryce Hastings, Project Programming, in New Direc-
tions in Architectural and Engineering Practice 211 (Howard G. Birnberg ed., 1992).
32. AIA Doc. B141, supra note 25, 2.2.
33. Id 2.3.
34. Id 2.4.
35. See supra part LEA.
36. A shop drawing is a detailed drawing prepared by a manufacturer prior to
fabrication showing how the contractor plans to perform the work. Sweet, supra note
20, § 15.08(C), at 287-94. The architect will define the critical design parameters for a
particular item but leave out many of the specifics, particularly when that item may be
available from a number of manufacturers. The contractor must submit a shop draw-
ing, showing how he proposes to do the work, for review by the architect in order to
verify consistency with the architect's design intent, as well as to assure that the design
conforms with all pertinent field conditions. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 3.12.
37. AIA Doc. B141, supra note 25, 2.5.
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Bidding requires a contractor to review the drawings and specifica-
tions and estimate his cost to complete the project.m Superficially, it
is an exercise of measuring quantities to establish the amount of
materials and labor required. It involves much more, however-par-
ticularly in estimating conditions for which there are a number of
unknowns. The contractor must understand the logistics of the site in
order to estimate project phasing.39 He must also estimate the impact
of details not shown on the drawings, establish the inconsistencies be-
tween the specifications and the drawings,40 and obtain the documents
that have been incorporated by reference in the design documents.
He must speculate as to the future hourly cost of labor, as well as how
inflation may impact material costs. He must also weigh risks that
have been assigned to him through different clauses that appear in the
construction contract. Thus, assembling a construction bid has very
much to do with assessing risk.
In contract terminology, a construction bid is an offer4" to provide
the materials and services described in the design documents for a
specific price. An owner may accept the bid (offer) of a contractor or
negotiate with a contractor through a process of counter offers to ar-
rive at an eventual acceptance of terms. If, however, an owner has
developed a relationship with a particular general contractor, he may
forego the entire bidding process and merely negotiate a deal.4 2 Re-
petitive dealings allow the parties to clearly understand each other's
needs and requirements. With the prospect of repeat work, a contrac-
tor has an incentive to service the owner's needs rather than "nickel
and dime" the owner based on the specifics of the construction docu-
ments. 3 Also, the specifics of the project's construction documents
may not need to be as rigorous if there is an understanding as to the
level of quality required based on prior work. In a market with many
potential clients and many contractors, neither side holds a superior
38. Sweet, supra note 20, § 22.03(C), at 468; see also John D. Calamari & Joseph
M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 2-6, at 42 (3d ed. 1987).
39. A contractor's bid will be based on an estimate of the cost it will take to com-
plete the job. It is based on design information shown on the drawings and other
documents provided to the bidder, as well as the contractor's own construction expe-
rience and his observations upon visiting the site. Dagostino, supra note 17, at 51-52.
40. A contractor has the burden of inquiring about discrepancies that would be
recognized by a reasonable bidder before submitting a bid. Wickham Contracting Co.
v. United States, 546 F.2d 395, 398 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
41. Sweet, supra note 20, § 22.04(C), at 473-74.
42. Negotiation has several benefits over competitive bidding. David T.
Douthwaite, Why Procure Construction by Negotiation?, 25 Pub. Cont. LI. 423, 425-
26 (1996). For example, a contractor can be used earlier in the construction process.
Id. at 426.
43. In a competitively bid construction contract, it is in the contractor's best inter-
est to submit the lowest bid possible in order to win the bid. Once won, the contract
price is fixed and the contractor may seek to exclude work by exploiting the ambigui-
ties in the contract in an effort to modify the price and secure additional profit. Sweet,
supra note 20, § 22.03(C), at 468.
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bargaining position. Through good faith negotiation, the parties come
to a fair agreement on contractual terms, including price, time of per-
formance, scope of goods and services, the risk allocation, and the
methods by which disputes are to be resolved.
Regardless of the award method, the agreement will be memorial-
ized in a contract, which will acknowledge: the drawings and specifi-
cations that formed the basis of the bargain;44 the terms of the
agreement, such as price,45 date of substantial completion, 6 and pay-
ments;47 responsibilities of the parties;48 and the method by which any
disputes will be settled.49 Although the parties are free to draft an
agreement in any way they choose, a standard contract drafted by the
AIA is commonly used because the architect will play a major role in
enforcing the contract and architects are generally familiar with its
terms. Large companies and public agencies may, however, have their
own standard contracts.5 0
D. The Construction Contract and the Problems of Construction
The typical construction project can lead to almost every conceiva-
ble contract issue. While the terms of the agreement may be memori-
alized by many pages of text, it is likely that many of the terms are far
from certain. As noted above, the contractor's bid is based on the
construction documents prepared by the architects and engineers."
Even design documents produced by the most diligent architects and
engineers, however, will leave unanticipated details that require fur-
ther interpretation and study by the architect during the course of
construction.52 Further, a mistake by the architect or engineer may
require modification of the design long after the award of a construc-
tion contract in order to comply with building codes or to assure that
the structure will not fail.53 There will also be conditions that were
not discovered when the design documents were prepared or that turn
out to be substantially different from those which the designers had
originally assumed. Finally, ac is his prerogative, the owner may wish
to make changes to the project during the course of construction that
result in contract modification. Thus, the owner and contractor may
have at one time agreed to a contract, but that contract is hardly a
44. AIA Document A101, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Contractor Where the Basis of Payment Is a Stipulated Sum, art. 9 (12th ed. 1987)
[hereinafter AIA Doc. A101].
45. Id. art. 4.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id. art. 5.
48. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13.
49. Id- 4.5.
50. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
51. See supra part I.C.
52. AIA Doc., B141, supra note 25, J 2.6.15-2.6.16.
53. See supra part I.E.2.
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static document. It must include protocols to resolve disagreements as
to the scope of work or the value of changes.
A typical construction contract s4 anticipates changes55 and provides
means to deal with these issues. 6 The contract typically calls upon
the architect to determine whether a contractor has "substantially
completed" work required for payment,' to determine whether a
contractor has met the level of quality established by the design docu-
ments,58 and to interpret the drawings.59 The contract may also allo-
cate risk by specifying the contractor's responsibilities in the event
that field conditions vary from those anticipated in the drawings and
specifications.60
The complex nature of the promises comprising a construction con-
tract compounds the need to resolve disputes between the owner and
contractor. A decision regarding even a minor aspect of the work can
have far reaching consequences. Delays in one part of the project
may mean that other work cannot be started within the project sched-
ule. 61 Starting and stopping work may not result in use of excess
materials, but will nonetheless affect the contractor's costs by increas-
ing the use of labor. At the outset, however, the construction contract
set a fixed price for the entire project.6' Someone will have to decide
whether the contract price and/or deadline should be revised. In or-
der to keep the project moving, construction decisions must be made
54. The most frequently used of the standard form documents that relate to the
relationship between owner and contractor are AIA Doc. A101 and AIA Doc. A201.
55. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, art. 7 (addressing changes in the work). The
change order is a written document prepared and signed by the architect. It is then
submitted for signature by the owner and contractor in order to establish agreement.
Id. 7.2.1.
56. Id. 4.2.8 (stating architect's role in preparing Change Orders and Construc-
tion Change Directives).
57. Id. J 4.2.9 (stating architect's role in determining date or dates of Substantial
Completion).
58. Id. 4.2.6 (stating architect's authority to reject work not in conformance with
the Contract Documents).
59. Id. 4.2.7 (stating architect's role of reviewing contractor's submittals for con-
formance with the "design concepts expressed in the Contract Documents").
60. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
61. Delays may be excusable if they are of no fault of the contractor and are suffi-
ciently severe. See Contracting & Material Co. v. City of Chicago, 314 N.E.2d 598 (I1.
App. Ct. 1974) (holding that an unforeseeable labor dispute was a valid reason for
delay). But see Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (stating that "[h]eavy rainfalls, unless they are unusual and extraordinary,
are not considered acts of God").
62. Most contractors are engaged on a project for a stipulated sum. However, in
projects of limited scope, a contract is sometimes based on the cost of the work plus a
fee. See, eg., AIA Document A117, Abbreviated Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Contractor for Construction Projects of Limited Scope Where the Basis of
Payment Is the Cost of the Work Plus a Fee with or Without a Guaranteed Maximum
Price (2d ed. 1987) (standard contract calling for a cost based fee). This discussion
focuses on the contracting of larger projects.
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quickly. Work may continue while issues are still in dispute,63 with
final resolution taking place after work has been done.6
E. The Construction Phase and Disputes
The actual construction takes place during the Construction
Phase.6 5 During construction, the contractor undertakes the bulk of
the activity. The contractor must secure the required building per-
mits66 and is responsible for keeping the construction schedule.6 The
contractor's work is monitored by the architect on the owner's be-
half.68 Where disputes develop between the owner and contractor,69
the architect takes on a role akin to an arbitrator.70
Given that the drawings and specifications manifest a basis for the
contractual agreement and a formal contract binds the parties, one
may ask why there should be disputes at all. On the surface, there are
many reasons to modify the agreement such as design modifications
made after the agreement, errors and omissions made on the design
documents, mistake, and unforeseen conditions. At the root of these
disputes lies money. Items contrary to either party's assumptions may
lead to variations in materials, labor, and time. In order to appreciate
the impact of changes, this part discusses some of the changes that
may come up during construction.
1. Design Changes
A client's needs may change midway through construction. Also,
because a designer works with drawings and rough scale models that
can only approximate the actual finished result, it is understandable
that aspects of a project cannot be appreciated until they begin to take
shape in reality. Rather than complete a project that no longer meets
63. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 7.1.2, 7.3.4. A Construction Change Direc-
tive is a change in the work agreed to by the owner and architect. The contractor may
or may not have agreed to such a change. Regardless, when a contractor receives a
Construction Change Directive, the contractor is required to promptly proceed with
the change. Id.
64. See id. 7.3.6. If the contractor does not agree to the contractual adjustment,
the architect is to determine a reasonable amount. The contractor disputing the
amount calculated by the architect must account for all costs as they are expended. Id.
If the issue remains in dispute, the matter is resolved through arbitration. Id. 4.5.
65. AIA Doc. B141, supra note '3, 2.6.
66. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 3.7.1.
67. Id. 3.10.
68. Some of the tasks that an architect will handle during construction are review
of drawings and submittals by the contractor, AIA Doc. B141, supra note 25, 1 2.6.12,
visits to the site to become familiar with job progress, id. 2.6.5, preparation of
Change Orders, id. 2.6.13, interpreting the contract documents, id. 2.6.16, and
certifying the Contractor's Application for Payment, id. J 2.6.10.
69. See supra part I.D.
70. For the view that the architect's inherent conflict of interest makes her an
improper arbitrator, see B. Scott Douglass, Comment, Reassessing the Architect's Role
as Arbiter, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 873 (1993).
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the client's needs or fails to meet the designer's vision, a design may
need to be modified.71 An owner's budget is typically crafted to allow
for a percentage of the project cost to cover such design
contingencies.'
2. Mistakes
Design is a long and time consuming process that must take multi-
ple factors into account simultaneously. Often, time is critical and de-
cisions are made on partial or incorrect information. Professionals
working on different construction disciplines toil simultaneously to
meet a deadline.73 For example, how different building systems inter-
face may not become apparent to the designers until all of the systems
are carefully drawn and coordinated or until the systems are actually
put into place. Therefore, changes to the project may result from the
mistaken assumptions of the architect and engineer.74 This places
self-interest into the architect's decision in arbitrating disputes. An
architect evaluating his own design is mindful that the owner may look
to recover from the architect if a change is based on the architect's
own error or omission and that the problems caused by the architect
may reflect in any future work for the owner. 75
3. Unforeseen Conditions
It is not possible to be entirely certain of particular construction
conditions which cannot be seen. A common example is subsurface
conditions. In designing a foundation, one will want to know the
depth and composition of each underlying strata. Although test bor-
ings will reasonably establish this depth for a particular location, the
subsurface topography may drop off significantly a few feet away,
making the precise design of a foundation difficult.76
Similarly, the existing conditions may not be known because they
are often covered over by finished materials. Water may penetrate
places that cannot be seen and cause corrosion of steel beams and
columns. Cracks in finished materials may be minor or may forecast
problems in the underlying substrate. Without invasive exploration,
71. Civitello, supra note 15, at 70-71.
72. Id. at 70. Owners typically plan on a contingency of 10% of the project cost to
cover change orders. Id
73. See supra note 28.
74. Architects and engineers may be liable for mistakes in design. Owners, wary
of this fact, will often require that their consultants have sufficient professional liabil-
ity insurance to cover items such as the errors and omissions. Sweet, supra note 20,
§ 18.05, at 391-95.
75. Brian M. Samuels, Construction Law 130 (1996).
76. Owners often try to disclaim the accuracy of information obtained regarding
subsurface conditions in an effort to place the risk of such conditions onto the con-
tractor. Sweet, supra note 20, § 29.04, at 645-58. Such efforts are not always success-
ful. Id-
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the need for repair may not be known until it is uncovered during
construction. A contractor may file a claim based on concealed or
unforeseen conditions; however, it will be up to the architect to decide
whether the condition is materially different and whether a change in
time or cost is to result.77
Moreover, excavation may uncover hazardous materials that must
be removed or treated by specially trained and licensed personnel. In
many cases, all construction must stop in order to insure the health
and safety of workers on the site.78 Similarly, construction may in-
volve existing structures that contain asbestos or lead paint. Although
in both of these cases tests done early in the design process will help
prevent some surprises from creeping up during construction, it is not
possible to be aware of everything.
4. Interpretation of Documents
Often times, documents must be interpreted during the construction
phase.79 Drawings and specifications may sometimes be at odds with
one another or intentionally leave out specifics that the architect may
want to control. In other cases, the contractor must prepare shop
drawings of assemblies that are based on the architect's design in-
tent.80 While it is preferable that such documents be clear and consis-
tent, at times an interpretation must be made that affects the methods
and materials used or whether work must be redone. 1 Much of this
decision making is necessarily subjective in nature.' For example, a
minor item like a handrail may be required but lack specificity. The
contractor, assuming a basic utilitarian function, may have anticipated
using an inexpensive steel pipe rail and priced the job accordingly.
The architect, on the other hand, may have considered a more aes-
thetic view and intended that a more elaborately detailed handrail
used in another area of the building be replicated here. This dispute
will have to be resolved in light of budget and quality considerations.
5. Contractor-Initiated Changes
During the construction phase, a contractor may propose a change
in the design or materials used in the project for any number of rea-
77. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, J 4.3.6.
78. Ia 1 10.1 (addressing safety precautions and programs). The contractor is to
stop work and report conditions to the architect and owner if he encounters asbestos
or polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB). Id. 1 10.1.2.
79. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
81. The architect is to visit the site and, through such observations, guard against
defects and deficiencies in the work. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 4.2.2. The
architect also certifies work for payment and may withhold such if it is necessary to
protect the owner. 1& 9.5.
82. See id 9.5. Such withholding may be made based on the architect's opinion.
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sons.s3 One common reason is to propose a more efficient or less
costly method of achieving a particular, agreed-upon result. The out-
come may involve a cost credit to the owner, although the contractor
will often look to retain the profit that he would have otherwise ob-
tained without the change.
With all of these changes, important decisions must be made.
Change orders must typically be approved by the owner, contractor,
and architect.84 In the first instance, however, someone must deter-
mine whether changed circumstances warranting a contractual modifi-
cation really exist. This requires an understanding as to what was
really purchased in the bid price. If the determination is deemed to
constitute a change, someone must also determine the value of the
change and whether additional time should be allotted for the comple-
tion of such work.85 In such circumstances, the owner's desire to hold
down costs and keep the project on schedule are clearly at odds with
the contractor's desire to coordinate the work of different construc-
tion trades and to avoid having his profits cut. Given these conflicts,
disputes regarding changes are inevitable.
Many ramifications may follow if a change order is required. The
architect may be required to issue additional drawings for which she
may or may not be compensated.86 The overall scope of the project
may change, requiring additional work which may mean additional
materials and/or labor for which the contractor will claim that he is
due additional compensation. Conversely, in some instances a change
may result in a reduction of costs, thus providing a credit to the owner.
The parties, therefore, must agree to the exact nature of the change
and how the agreement is to be modified.
Moreover, a change order may be required to resolve an inconsis-
tency without which other work may not be able to proceed.' This
can result in an overall delay in the project's completion. Claims for
delays are common when a contractor is unable to complete a task as
efficiently as he may otherwise have done, but for the change or the
lack of a timely decision. Tune is particularly an issue when the con-
tract makes the contractor liable for damages (liquidated or other-
wise) incurred because of a missed contractual deadline or when a
83. Civitello, supra note 15, at 83.
84. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 7.1.2.
85. IL 7.2.1.
86. Similar to the work of the contractor, an architect must determine whether
such work is part of her basic services contract. If not, she may seek compensation
from the owner as an additional service. AIA Doc. B141, supra note 25, 3.1.
87. See Sweet, supra note 20, § 24.03(B), at 520-31. Discrepancies may be raised
between documents of the same set, such as information on drawings that conflicts
with the specifications. See, e.g., Franchi Constr. Co. v. United States, 609 F.2d 984(CL Cl. 1979) (citing contract's precedence clause removing conflict between draw-
ings and specifications); Union Management Corp. v. United States, 375 F.2d 804 (Ct.
CL 1967) (adding that contractor was contractually obligated to promptly bring dis-
crepancies to the attention of the Contracting Officer).
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contractor misses the opportunity to collect a bonus tied to a timely
completion clause.'
The interrelationship of the multiple future promises that make up
a construction project cause otherwise simple problems to affect the
overall job.89 It would be impractical to settle all decisions on an adju-
dicative basis at the time of their occurrence.90 Resulting project de-
lays would stand to hurt both the owner and contractor. It is for this
reason that the architect is often placed in the role of arbitrator during
the construction process.91 Although the architect has a vested inter-
est in keeping her client (the owner) satisfied, she is at least familiar
with the problem at hand. In order to prevent delays, a contractor is
typically required to continue to work on the project despite the dis-
pute.9" Ultimately, the decision may be protested and settled later
under true neutral party arbitration or adjudication after the fact.93
Continuing disputed work may be acceptable, as long as the dispute
may be ultimately settled in a fair forum.
II. Tim SPECIAL CASE OF PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTING
In many ways, government contracting of construction work is quite
different from contracting in the private sector. At the root of this
difference is the manner in which the work is solicited and the manner
in which disputes may be resolved. The private contracting model of-
fers many advantages over the government model. That is not to say,
however, that government should necessarily look to "go private."'9
Government contracting must take the form it does because, as noted
above, there is a need for accountability to the public.
88. Incentives for meeting a deadline can be either positive or negative. Delays
may mean consequential damages or reasonable liquidated damages set by the con-
tract. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 38, § 14-31(c), at 642-43. An example of an
incentive arrangement is a contractual bonus given to the contractor if he completes
the project by a pre-stated date. Dagostino, supra note 17, at 153-54.
89. Compounding this problem are factors such as trade usage, course of dealing,
and course of performance. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 38, § 3-17, at 178-81.
90. Time is an important part of the contract. See supra part I.A.2. Since delays
will cause additional injuries, the parties have a duty to mitigate damages. Calamari
& Perillo, supra note 38, § 14-15, at 610-13.
91. See supra notes 59 & 68-70, and accompanying text.
92. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 1 4.3.4. Changes that are agreed to by the
architect and owner, but not necessarily the Contractor, are considered Construction
Change Directives. While the architect is to determine the change in cost and time
resultant from such a directive, the Contractor may dispute such determination and
account for all applicable costs. If the dispute is not resolved, it may become subject
to the dispute resolution provisions of the contract. Id 1 7.3.
93. Ia 4.3.4. In the standard agreement between owner and contractor, contro-
versies dealing with the contract are settled in arbitration under the Construction In-
dustry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Id. 91 4.5.
94. But see Douthwaite, supra note 42, at 431 (arguing against the policy of relying
primarily upon competitive bidding in public contracting and in favor of negotiated
contracts).
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This part discusses the unique nature of public works contracting. It
begins by examining the various goals that the government seeks to
achieve through public works contracting. It then looks at the need
for apparent fairness and how this need necessarily results in the com-
petitive bidding process. Next, it explains how competitive bidding
has adhesionary consequences, such as unfairly allocated risk. This
part discusses the use of in-house architects and engineers and how
this affects dispute resolution. Further, this part examines the roots of
the government's advantage over contractors in dispute resolution-
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finally, this part examines the
government's perspective and the problems it faces in contracting for
construction work.
A. The Multiple Goals of Public Works
Government construction serves many purposes. As a primary pur-
pose, construction provides the infrastructure within which govern-
ment, business, and the public operates. Spending on public works
also provides a stimulus to the local economy through the creation of
jobs. 5 It also has allowed government to foster social and economic
goals.9 6 Contracting policies have been used to promote small busi-
nesses, minority owned businesses, women owned businesses, and lo-
cal manufacturing. 97
Government construction, like private construction, aims to achieve
an end product which meets the needs of its constituency. This in-
volves bringing a construction project to completion on time and on
budget. Since the government rarely uses its own workers to com-
plete its own projects, it must acquire the goods and services it needs
through private industry. Most of these goods and services are ob-
tained through publicly held competitive bidding on a sealed bid
basis.98
The government's secondary goals are achieved through the very
act of awarding the work itself. Congress has long used "pork barrel"
projects to trade off political favors, including the location of public
works projects. During the 1800s, construction of roads, canals, and
railroads helped employ new immigrants. 9 During the Panic of 1893,
some cities used public works to deal with twenty percent unemploy-
ment levels.' 00 In the wake of the Great Depression, the Roosevelt
Administration used public works projects to help put the country
95. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. See infra part I.B.
99. American Public Works Association, History of Public Works in the United
States 1776-1976 10 (Ellis L. Armstrong ed., 1976) [hereinafter History of Public
Works].
100. Id.
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back to work with the formation of the Federal Emergency Adminis-
tration of Public Works (known commonly as the Public Works Ad-
ministration). 1 1 Today, public works expenditures are used to
stimulate the economy, by creating construction jobs and by providing
infrastructure for private sector growth.
Social, as well as economic, goals of government contracting were
advanced during the 1970s and 1980s. Growing sentiment against ris-
ing foreign debt and the loss of jobs offshore renewed interest in pro-
tectionist procurement policies. °2 Today, most states have enacted
legislation that gives local manufacturers some preference in procure-
ment.'0 3 Construction contracting rules may prescribe workers' mini-
mum wages. °4 Additionally, the civil rights and the women's
movements raised issues of present day discrimination based on his-
torical bias. Accordingly, government contracts have promoted par-
ticipation by small, women-owned, and minority-owned businesses
through the use of quotas or targeted percentages. 10 5 Local govern-
ments have encouraged smaller businesses through the division of
101. Jack F. Isakoff, The Public Works Administration 9-10 (1938). Federal public
works proposals were promoted from 1918 through 1932. Id. at 11-17. The use of
public works to address unemployment was unsuccessfully proposed during the de-
pressions of the 1850s and 1870s. History of Public Works, supra note 99, at 10.
102. A prime example of protectionism in procurement is the Buy American Act,
which requires that products purchased by the federal government be substantially
comprised of American made components. See Morris D. Davis, Comment, The Do-
mestic Components Requirement of the Buy American Act. Dismayed in America?, 36
A.F. L. Rev. 129, 129 (1992). The Buy American Act was passed in 1933 and signed
into law on President Hoover's last day in office. In part, it retaliated against similar
protectionist legislation passed by the British. Its timing coincided with high unem-
ployment rates brought on by the Great Depression, protectionist sentiment, and the
construction of the Hoover Dam. According to the Act, the "end product" procured
by the federal government must be manufactured in the United States and "substan-
tially all" of the components making up the product must also be manufactured in the
United States. Id. at 130. Originally, the definition of "substantially all" meant that
no more than 25% of the value of the total product could be comprised of foreign
components. This was revised to 50% by President Eisenhower through his Executive
Order No. 10,582 (issued on December 17, 1954). Id. at 132.
103. Doreen J. Piligian, Resident Preference Laws and the Award of Public Con-
tracts, Construction Law., May 10, 1990, at 10.
104. Julian E. Lange & Daniel Q. Mills, The Construction Industry: Balance Wheel
of the Economy 42 (1979). Many state construction contracts set prevailing wage
rates that contractors must pay each specific type of worker. In addition, the Davis-
Bacon Act (passed in 1931) mandated that workers on federal public works projects
must be paid the same wages that workers are customarily paid in the particular local-
ity for the same type of work. History of Public Works, supra note 99, at 13.
105. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a racial
affirmative action program prescribed by state and local governments may be upheld
if it is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest).
For a look at state minority set-aside programs in public works after the decision in
Croson, see Deborah S. Ballati, Legislation Since Croson, Construction Law., Jan. 13,
1993, at 7.
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projects among different contracts, 0 6 even though this practice results
in higher project costs than if bid as a single project. Clearly, govern-
ment construction contracting involves more than just bricks and
mortar.
B. The Appearance of Fairness
An iniportant aim in the government's procurement of goods and
services is the appearance of fairness. Nowhere is this more important
than in the start of the relationship with the contractor, at the project's
initial bidding stage. The expenditure of large amounts of govern-
ment money to private industry makes it important that work be
awarded free from political influence and corrupt practices. Legisla-
tion typically mandates that construction work awards above a stated
minimum amount must be made through sealed competitive
bidding.10 7
Competitive bidding essentially allows anyone meeting the require-
ments stated in the design documents to submit a bid. If an award is
made, it will go to the lowest "responsible" or "qualified" bidderY' s
Because price is the sole criterion used in granting the award,"° all
bidders must offer the same package of products and services based
106. An example of this is New York Su .e, which requires that most public con-
tracting construction work be bid under separate prime contracts rather than under a
single general contractor. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 101 (McKinney 1986); N.Y. State
Fm. Law § 135 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996).
107. See e.g., Ala. Code §§ 39-2-2, 39-2-6 (1992 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. Gen. Mun.
Law § 103 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 638(8) (1990); 41
U.S.C. § 253(b) (1994). A good example of such a statute is found in the state of
Oregon. Competitive bidding is generally required for public contracts, but excep-
tions to this rule include contracts for supplies valued at less than S2,500. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 279.015 (1993).
The federal government requires sealed bids in most construction work as part of
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. Pub. L No. 98-369, §§ 2701, 2711, 98
Stat. 1175, 1175 (1984). One commentator favors negotiation over competitive bid-
ding. See Douthwaite, supra note 42.
108. Lange & Mills, supra note 104, at 40-41. The operative word here is "quali-
fied." Some states require that public works bidders have a demonstrated ability to
do the work. An agency may require information related to prior similar work, as
well as financial information about the bidder. Should the agency believe that the
bidder is not able to perform the work, the bid may be deemed not responsible and
will not be considered. Id. The determination that lacks responsibility is normally not
appealable, absent fraud or abuse of discretion. Albert E. Phillips & Robert L
Crewdson, Contracting with the Owner, in Construction Contractor's Handbook of
Business and Law 89, 93 (Robert F. Cushman et al. eds., 1992). An unsuccessful bid-
der, however, challenge the bid. See infra note 152.
109. Some states, however, give preference to in-state bids. For example, Alaska
will accept an in-state bidder over a nonresident bidder if the former's bid is not more
than fifteen percent higher. Alaska Stat. § 36.30.170(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995). Arizona
gives a five percent advantage to bidders who use locally manufactured or produced
materials, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 34-242 (1989), as does New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-1-21(B) (Michie 1978). Maine gives in-state bidders an advantage when there is
a tie between bids. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 1816(8) (West 1989).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
on the same design documents and standard agency contract. The
bidding process, however, is not always this simple, and in fact can be
much more complex.
Sealed bidding procedures are intended to provide "full and open
competition,"110 placing all those who are interested in a contract on
equal footing. Not every firm will be considered "responsible" or
"qualified," however. There are both objective and subjective meas-
ures used in denying the opportunity of an award to a potential bid-
der. On an objective basis, courts have interpreted "responsible" to
mean a firm is technically and financially capable of completing a
job."' A bidder may need to meet a minimum level of experience
with projects of the size and type being bid, and demonstrate sufficient
staffing and bonding capability. Furthermore, as seen below, a bidder
may be found to be not "responsible" based on more subjective
factors.
For instance, an agency may refuse to award a bid to a contractor
based on "moral" responsibility." 2 In New York City, for example,
the belief that a bidder is corrupt or "irresponsible" is grounds for
denying the bidder a contract.1 3 If the bidder is alleged to be in-
volved in criminal activity, a contract may not be awarded." 4 The
New York City Comptroller may object to an award "if in the comp-
troller's judgment there is sufficient reason to believe that there is
possible corruption... or that the proposed contractor is involved in
corrupt activity.""' 5 Denying the application of a would-be contractor
is an exercise of subjective discretion; the awarding of a contract is not
a right and, therefore, a due process hearing is not required." 6
A public agency solicits bids by publicly displaying the Invitation to
Bid, advertising in newspapers and trade publications, publishing the
Invitation in a government publication, or mailing Invitations to Bid
to those on a list maintained by the procuring agency." 7 In the Invita-
tion to Bid, the agency will describe the type, location, and approxi-
110. Donald P. Arnavas & William J. Ruberry, Government Contract Guidebook
2-17 (1980).
111. Frank Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Purging Corruption from Public Con-
tracting: The "Solutions" Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 143,
146 (1995).
112. Id at 146-47.
113. N.Y. City Rules & Regs., vol. 4, tit. 9, § 5-02 (1995).
114. Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 111, at 153-54. In the event of alleged crimi-
nal activity, the agency may declare the contractor "non-responsible" without any
reason. The contractor may still be awarded the contract, but the award will be
delayed. Id
115. N.Y. City Charter, ch. 13, § 328(c) (1990).
116. Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note 111, at 147; see also Erving v. Mayor of New
York, 29 N.E. 1101, 1102 (N.Y. 1892) (explaining that the lowest bidder is not entitled
to a contract).
117. Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 3-12. But see id. at 2-15 (noting that
procurement methods vary from agency to agency).
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mate size of the project, as well as the formalities of the bidding
process." 8
The drawings and specifications that comprise the bid package spell
out the project's requirements. In addition to the methods and mater-
ials depicted in the design documents, specific procedures are estab-
lished for the bids themselves. For example, the owner may evaluate
the contractor's bid for a designated period of time." 9 All bidders are
given an equal amount of time to prepare their bids. Bidders may
attend a walk-through of a project site to familiarize themselves with
conditions and may pose clarifying questions to the agency.'2 0 Should
there be clarifications, changes or modifications to the scope of the
project, additional information will be made available to all prospec-
tive bidders. 2 '
Bids are submitted in sealed envelopes at the specific time and
place stated in the bid documents. 22 In pursuit of complete fairness,
bids for public contracts are opened publicly at the time and place
stated in the Invitation to Bid."2 In this way, public bid openings al-
low bidders to monitor the process. Upon identification of an appar-
ent low bidder by the government, the bidder may be asked to
confirm his bid, ensuring that no mistakes were made.124 Simultane-
ously, unsuccessful bidders have the opportunity to raise challenges.
After the completion of this process, assuming all is in order, the bid is
accepted and a contract will be signed.125
Bidders are general contractors that, if successful, will be responsi-
ble for the overall construction of the project. While they may handle
certain aspects of a project themselves, general contractors subcon-
tract much of the work to other businesses. The owner, however, may
retain some control over the selection of a subcontractor.126 Subcon-
tractors are typically smaller and more specialized than general con-
118. Sweet, supra note 20, § 22.03(B), at 465-68.
119. Id. § 22.03(D), at 468-69.
120. Id. at 466-67.
121. Id. at 467.
122. Id. § 22.03(D), at 468-69.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Peerless Casualty Co. v. Housing Auth., 228 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir.
1955) (allowing a low bidder who had discovered an accounting error to withdraw its
bid because, at the time the bid was withdrawn, the award was still subject to approval
by the Public Housing Administration, thus, the offer was withdrawn before accept-
ance); see also Calamari & Perillo, supra note 38, § 9-27, at 386-88 (discussing unilat-
eral mistake). Relief for mistake in computation had been given if the party receiving
the bid knew of the error or if it were obvious. More recently, courts have given relief
when such error was not known or so obvious. Id. at 387 & n.34.
125. The government, however, expressly reserves the right to reject all bids.
Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 3-38 to 3-39. There is no obligation for the
owner to make an award. For example, funds may be insufficient for the project or
the project may no longer be required. Id. at 3-39.
126. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 1 5.3 (stating that the owner may retain the
right to object to the use of a subcontractor, and thus affect the price of the contract).
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tractors. The successful general contractor signs the contract with the
owner, 127 putting the general contractor in privity with the owner. A
subcontractor is responsible only to the general contractor, as the gen-
eral contractor is the only party with which the subcontractor holds a
contract.12
General contractors typically work with subcontractors with whom
they are familiar because of the general contractor's overall responsi-
bility for the work.'2 9 The general contractor may negotiate with the
subcontractor or obtain competitive quotes from other subcontractors
to ensure that he obtains the most favorable price. To arrive at his
bid, the general contractor will tabulate the prices submitted by his
subcontractors and add his costs, including those related to the coordi-
nation of this effort.
There are situations where sealed bidding is not deemed appropri-
ate. When such an exception is made, a contract will be awarded
through the solicitation of competitive proposals. For example, the
nature of the procurement may not allow sufficient time to go through
the sealed bid process, the nature of the contract may require that
factors other than price be considered in awarding the contract, the
contract may necessitate discussions with the bidders, or there may
only be one proposal submitted. 3 ° Situations in which there will only
be a single proposal, however, should be avoided. Sole source suppli-
ers have been used to subvert the competitive bid process through the
use of political influence.' 3 '
C. Problems with Competitive Bidding
Given the need for uniformity, the government bidding process is
particularly rigid. Although this rigidity is useful in promoting the ap-
pearance of fairness, it is also the basis for other practices that make
public works contracting less than fair. The sealed bidding process
solicits competition from contractors looking to furnish goods and
services on the basis of price. 32 At the same time, agencies look to
shift risks, such as uncertain construction conditions, to contractors
127. For a good example of a typical owner-contractor agreement see AIA Doc.
A101, supra note 44.
128. See Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 21-2 to 21-3; see also Sweet, supra
note 20, § 32.01, at 723-27 (discussing the contractual relationship between a contrac-
tor and a subcontractor).
129. AIA Doc. A201, supra note 13, 5.3.1 (outlining the responsibilities of the
contractor).
130. Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 4-2 to 4-3.
131. An example of such abuse of sole-source procurement was the 1986 scandal
involving a contract for hand-held computers purchased by the New York City Park-
ing Violations Bureau ("PVB"). In this case, a PVB deputy director with financial
ties to a supplier caused the specifications for the bid to be written in such a way as to
give a single supplier an enormous advantage. See Anechiarico & Jacobs, supra note
111, at 147-48.
132. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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who are encouraged to undervalue such risk.'33 Many agencies em-
ploy their own in-house architects and engineers rather than hiring
outside consultants, eliminating a potentially neutral and objective
force in dispute resolution."3 When disputes do arise between the
parties, government agencies have an upper hand because of the pow-
ers that originate in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 35
This section takes an in depth look at some of the problems caused
by the sealed competitive bidding process. First, it looks at how bid-
ding on the basis of price creates non-negotiable terms. This section
then focuses on risk, one such non-negotiable term, and shows sealed
competitive bids unfairly shifts risks to the contractor.
1. Adhesionary Aspects
Sealed bids attempt to reduce the variables of a contract down to a
single element-price. Modification of these bid variables are un-
likely prior to the contract award. Thus, the terms of government con-
tracts are effectively non-negotiable. Moreover, important factors
such as risk allocation and methods of dispute resolution are embed-
ded in an agency's general conditions and standard contract. 136 Stan-
dardized contracts are used in both private and public contracting
settings and are necessary as a practical means of determining
rights. 137 While there is room for negotiation in a private construction
contract, revision of material terms in a standard agency contract
would open up the possibility of challenge by an unsuccessful bidder.
Given immutable terms in a form contract, one may argue that the
terms of a sealed bid contract are essentially contracts of adhesion.' s
The rigidity of sealed bidding eliminates the bargained for aspect of
the deal. Rather than negotiating on an even-handed basis, the con-
tractor is left with the option to take it or leave it. Since public works
often deal with projects such as roads, bridges, tunnels, subways, and
other projects not commonly required by the private sector, for con-
133. See infra part II.C.2.
134. See infra part I1D.
135. See infra part II.E.
136. Robert A. Rubin et al., Construction Claims Analysis, Presentation, Defense 4
(1983) (noting that in publicly bid projects, many public officials prefer a harsh con-
tract that allocates every conceivable risk to the contractor).
137. Contracts for construction are often based on standard documents such as
those by the AIA, National Society of Professional Engineers and Associated Gen-
eral Contractors. Sweet supra note 20, § 1.09, at 8.
Standardized contracts are useful to both the Owner and Contractor because the
parties become familiar with its provisions. Meanings of contractual clauses becomes
more certain, having been interpreted over the course of time. In addition, standard-
ized contracts are more convenient to the contracting official who must often enforce
several contracts simultaneously.
138. See Sweet, supra note 20, § 5.04(C), at 53. Arguing that a contract is adhesive
must, however, show that the parties were of uneven bargaining power. Id.
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tractors whose specialty lies in these areas, this option may mean the
difference between working or not working.
2. Risk Allocation and the Forced Bargain
Assuming uneven bargaining power, risk is unfairly allocated within
the context of a public works contract. 139 Selling a completed product
or a commodity allows a producer to take stock of his costs and profit
before offering the item at a particular price. Construction, however,
deals with a future product that is subject to change. With the many
unknowns in the construction process, assigning a price implicitly in-
volves assigning a value to the risk inherent in the contract. In order
to assure himself a favorable price, the owner typically attempts to
assign as much of this risk as possible to the contractor. 140 While this
is arguably a valid exercise in the private contracting realm, this may
not be so in competitively bid public contracts. Private contracting
allows for free negotiation between the parties before establishing the
terms and conditions of a contract. 4' Conversely, competitive sealed
bidding procedures used in public works contracting awards a contract
to the lowest bid on a specific package of components with specific,
non-negotiable terms. Since the cost associated with risk is a signifi-
cant component of the price, competitive bidding rewards those who
value risk the least. Subsequently, many construction disputes revolve
around determining who in fact assumed a particular risk and, thus,
who should pay for it. 4
There are many risks associated with contracting. 4 3 Some risks are
squarely within the contractor's control. For example, a contractor
can manage worker safety through training and instituting proper pro-
cedures. 44 Further, a contractor can manage the risk of inflation by
ordering materials shortly after the award of the contract rather than
waiting and speculating over the price. These risks are best attributa-
ble to the contractor because he is in the best position to manage
139. Alternatively, it may be argued that such risk is contractually assumed. Id.
§ 27.03(B), at 594.
140. Rubin, supra note 136, at 13 (noting that a fixed price contract assigns project
risks almost entirely on the contractor).
141. See supra part I.C.
142. An example of such risk allocation is the "no damages for delay clause," in
which the owner tries to shield himself from contractor claims based on delays caused
by the owner. While present in a contract, the court may find such a clause unen-
forceable. Samuels, supra note 75, at 19.
143. One measure of risk is the continued viability of the entity itself. The rate of
business failure in the construction industry is relatively high-13.4% in 1990. Sidney
M. Levy, Project Management in Construction 4 (2d ed. 1994).
144. A contractor is primarily responsible for complying with the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. Sweet, supra note 20, at 816.
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them.145 There are, however, risks which the contractor cannot con-
trol, but must nonetheless account for when preparing a bid.
The design of a complex structure can take a long period of time
from conception to the production of working drawings. During that
time, most aspects of the building will be considered and documented
in the drawings and specifications. 1' Even then, there will be many
aspects of the building that remain unclear or problems that must be
decided in the course of construction.'47 The architect cannot know
what the answers to these problems or ambiguities will be because the
questions have yet to be asked.
In putting together the bid, a general contractor will have several
weeks to review the drawings and examine the site before submitting
the bid.' 8 During this time, he must determine what unknown or un-
defined aspects are included in the contract and how much they will
cost. For example, a foundation may be designed to a given depth.
The contractor may encounter bedrock earlier than expected and
must blast away rock to achieve the required depth. He may also en-
counter an underground stream and be required to deal with the ad-
ded complexities of construction in the middle of water. Subsurface
and other hidden conditions will often reveal unforeseen conditions
late in the construction process. The contractor is placed in a difficult
situation because of this potential for unforeseen complications.
The government will often seek to limit the potential for cost in-
creases. By inserting a contractual clause, the government can seek to
limit the contractual effect of delays to an extension of time rather
than higher costs.'49 Many owners, including the government, would
rather pay a fixed additional cost rather than take on the risk of a
much higher cost.' 50 One may argue that including such allocated risk
145. The allocation of risk to the contractor in a lump sum agreement is based on
the assumption of the contractor's expertise, putting him in the better position to
control costs. Phillips, supra note 108, at 98-99.
146. See supra part I.B.
147. See supra part I.E.4.
148. A clause which disclaims liability for conditions which differ from those found
at the site requires the contractor to visit the site and familiarize himself with the
conditions. Where it would be reasonable for a contractor to see the discrepancy in
such a site visit, this clause may shield the owner. Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson,
636 P.2d 1034, 1036-37 (Utah 1981). But see Fattore Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage
Comm'n, 454 F.2d 537,543 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding contractor not liable when subsur-
face conditions entitled contractor to an equitable adjustment).
149. See, eg., Northeast Clackamas County Elec. Co-op v. Continental Casualty
Co., 221 F.2d 329, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that owner wrongfully refused to
grant contractor's requested extension of time when such a clause existed in its con-
tract); A. Kaplen & Son, Ltd. v. Housing Auth., 126 A.2d 13, 15 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1956) (holding that contractor has no claim for damages but only an extension of
time to complete the contract). No damage for delay costs clauses may be contractu-
ally provided for within the agreement between the owner and contractor and are
generally upheld.
150. But see Differing Site Conditions, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2(a)-(b) (1995). The fed-
eral differing site conditions clause provides:
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in a construction contract is a valid exercise of the freedom of con-
tract. The better argument, however, is that the dynamics of public
competitive bidding make shedding of risk that is out of the contrac-
tor's control inherently unfair because it is a non-negotiable term that
the contractor is coerced into undervaluing.
If a contractor qualifies his price by refusing to accept certain risks,
his bid must be disregarded as not responsive to the bid's require-
ments. 151 Such a deviation would likely prompt a bid protest.15  An
unsuccessful bidder could claim that his bid would have been lower
but for the particular provision of the contract. Under federal con-
tracting rules, a bid protest may delay the award, stop the award, or
suspend a contract.' 53 Moreover, a successful challenge may result in
the contract being re-bid, thus delaying the project. Additionally, a
successful protester may be awarded the costs associated with filing
the protest, including attorney fees,' 54 as well as the costs associated
with preparing the bid or proposal.' 55 Given this potential impact,
terms such as risk allocation are non-negotiable.
A contractor, therefore, must accept risks assigned tu him in a gov-
ernment contract, including those that are out of his control. As an
element of his bid price, the way in which this risk is evaluated can be
crucial. The contractor who undervalues or ignores such risk is re-
warded because it reflects in a lower bid price. The contractor who
places a higher value on that risk will likely end up with a higher bid
price, which in the competitive bid situation, is perceived as asking for
(a) The Contractor shall promptly, and before the conditions are disturbed,
give a written notice to the Contracting Officer of (1) subsurface or latent
physical conditions at the site which differ materially from those indicated in
this contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual
nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily encountered and gener-
ally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the
contract.
(b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the site conditions promptly
after receiving the notice. If the conditions do materially so differ and cause
an increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for,
performing any part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed
as a result of the conditions, an equitable adjustment shall be made under
this clause and the contract modified in writing accordingly.
Id.
151. A nonconforming bid must be rejected if the defect is not waivable. Sweet,
supra note 20, § 22.03(F), at 469-70; see also Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 3-
24 to 3-26 (describing the reasons for considering a bid nonresponsive).
152. Policies on bid challenges vary. Some jurisdictions do not allow unsuccessful
bidders to challenge an award for lack of standing. The federal government allows
contractors to protest under the Competition in Contracting Act. ABA Section on
Public Contract Law, The Protest Experience Under the Competition in Contracting
Act 1-4 (1989).
153. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)-(d) (1994).
154. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1)(A) (1994).
155. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1)(B) (1994).
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a higher profit. As a result, the contractor is coerced into undervalu-
ing risk.
D. In-House Architects and Engineers
Large government agencies often use their own staff of architects
and engineers to prepare the design and documents used for construc-
tion." 6 During construction, however, the architect is often placed in
situations that require decisions that will affect the terms and scope of
the contract. 57 As a direct employee of the owner, however, the in-
house professional is placed in an ethical conflict when resolving dis-
putes between the owner and contractor.
An architect may be asked to determine the adequacy of a contrac-
tor's work. As a professional, this is an opinion based on acceptable
construction practices and what is fair, in light of the construction doc-
uments. 1-5 As an employee of the government agency, however, the
architect is also an agent of the owner. That employee may also be
responsible for the budget and schedule of the project, factors on
which her performance will be evaluated. Given a vested interest, the
judgment of an in-house architect is very likely to be biased against
the contractor.
One may argue that a consultant architect or engineer hired by an
owner faces similar conflicts in dealing with contractors. By favoring
the owner, an architect stands to preserve her relationship with hopes
of gaining future work.5 9 The in-house architect's interest in favoring
the owner, though, is stronger because her continued employment de-
pends on that owner, while the consultant architect has many other
clients.
E. Sovereign Immunity-Controlling Dispute Resolution
A particularly important term in a government construction con-
tract is the one that addresses dispute resolution. Unlike private
builders, governments have traditionally been protected from civil
lawsuits through the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Many govern-
mental entities have partially waived this right, but this has not placed
governments on the same footing as their private contracting counter-
parts. In response, a variety of dispute resolution systems have been
instituted, none of which, however, provides absolute fairness.
156. Even if an outside design firm is hired, the selection process faces some of the
same fairness issues raised by competitive sealed bid awards of construction contracts.
Unlike construction contracts, however, the hiring of design consultants involves spe-
cifics of qualifications as well as design fees. As a result, the selection process has a
necessarily subjective component.
157. See supra part I.E.
158. Douglass, supra note 70, at 888-92.
159. Id. at 891-92.
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The sovereign immunity doctrine originated in England, where it
was not possible to sue the king in the king's court, as "the King could
do no wrong.' 16' The doctrine was adopted in the American colonies
in suits against the crown and was embraced at the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention.161 Sovereign immunity was extended to state
governments in federal courts with the enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution. 62
Periodically, Congress saw the need to compensate individuals for
particular government wrongs and, in response, passed a number of
private relief bills.' 63 Increasing requests for relief led Congress to
pass a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that created the Court of
Claims to hear contractual claims against the federal government.'"
This waiver was expanded through the passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act to tort claims resulting from non-traditional categories of
intentional torts, but explicitly excluded the "discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or and employee of the Govern-
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.' 65 Federal
construction contracts were subsequently drafted to include dispute
clauses calling for the use of agency Boards of Contract Appeals.'
66
Today, construction claims against the federal government may be dis-
puted in either an agency Board of Contract Appeals or the Claims
Court.167
The states have not consistently waived sovereign immunity. Some
states have waived sovereign immunity through statute,168 but the spe-
160. Black's Law Dictionary 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
161. Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level. A
Hodgepodge of Remedies, 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 265, 267 (1996).
162. Id at 268; see Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 274 (4th ed. 1983).
163. Brian R. Levey, Tortious Government Conduct and the Government Contract.
Tort, Breach of Contract, or Both?, 22 Pub. Cont. L.J. 706, 713 (1993).
164. Id The Court of Claims was created by the Act of February 24, 1855. Id. In
1887, the Tucker Act expressly limited the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims against
hearing tort claims against the federal government. Id. at 714.
165. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (1994).
166. Levey, supra note 163 at 716-17, 717 n.64.
167. See infra part lII.C.
168. Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-821 (1992 & Supp.
1996); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 19-10-101, 19-11-246 (Michie 1994); Cal. Pub. Cont. Code
§ 10240.1 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-160 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Ga.
Code Ann. § 50-21-1 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 103D-703, 103D-711 (1993); Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 705, para. 505-8 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1996); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-16-
1.1 (West 1986); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 46-913 (1993 & Supp. 1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 45A.245 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38:2181 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 1510-A (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); Md. Code
Ann. State Gov't § 12-201 (1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.6419 (West 1987);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.08 (West 1988); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-45-1 (1972); Mont. Code
Ann. § 18-1-404 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8, 215 & 81-8, 301 (1994); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 41.031 (Michie 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:8 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 59:13-3 (West 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-23 (Michie 1978); N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8
(Consol. 1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12-02 (1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.02
(Anderson 1992 & Supp. 1995); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.310 & 30.320 (1988 & Supp.
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cifics of court access vary by state. 169 Many states have established
administrative boards, similar to the federal Board of Contract Ap-
peals, to hear contractual claims. 7 In some states where legislatures
have not waived sovereign immunity, courts have waived it on public
policy grounds.' 7 '
In most cases, government agencies draft contracts with clauses
specifying the method of dispute resolution available to the private
party; thus, the rules of the game are set by the government.
Although the government has ceded most of these rights voluntarily,
it has done so hesitantly.
F. The Problems of Competitive Bidding-A Government View
To be fair, competitive bidding presents a number of problems for
government agencies as well. Unlike private contracting, public
awards must be made without the appearance of bias.' 7 While a pri-
vate developer has complete discretion to exclude a contractor, the
same cannot be said for government agencies. Moreover, unlike in
private contracting where a builder may develop a particularly good
working relationship with a contractor, in government contracting the
government cannot assure the selection of a favored contractor be-
cause of the sealed bid system.
Any contractor meeting the objective requirements must be consid-
ered under the sealed bidding process. The government may exclude
a contractor that has submitted an unresponsive bid or is not responsi-
ble. 73 Finding that a bid is unresponsive is an objective determina-
tion that the contractor has failed to comply with a material term. 74
Finding a bidder not responsible, however, is a subjective determina-
tion that a contractor is apparently unable to successfully complete
the project. 75 In ether case, the failed bidder may slow down or stop
the award process through a bid challenge.1 76
1996); 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4651-1 (1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-13.1-1 (1990); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 21-32-1 (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307 (1992 & Supp. 1996);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 11-69, 11-70 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1996); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.92.010 (West 1988); W. Va. Code § 14-2-12
(1995); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104 (1988).
169. Baker, supra note 161, at 269.
170. See infra part Ifl.B (discussing procedures in the state of Maryland based on
the ABA Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments).
171. Baker, supra note 161, at 270-71.
172. Fairness in competitive bidding is necessary in order to ensure that "honest
and capable bidders [will] have enough confidence in the system to submit bids."
Sweet, supra note 20, § 22.03(A), at 465.
173. Arnavas & Ruberry, supra note 110, at 3-23.
174. Id at 3-24 to 3-26.
175. Id. at 3-26 to 3-28. A bidder may be found not responsible based on a contrac-
tor's lack of resources, ability to meet the prospective schedule, past record of per-
formance, integrity, qualifications, experience, facilities, and skills. Id. at 3-26.
176. See supra note 152.
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It is costly for individual agencies to institute intricate procedures to
prevent awarding contracts to corrupt or criminal contractors. 177
Moreover, the paperwork required to submit a bid and the discretion-
ary power yielded by contracting agencies results in disinterest among
honest bidders. 178 In many ways, due process allows bad faith actors
to continue their ways while the system goes on. This is not to say that
the government is powerless. It just means, as this Note suggests, that
the government must work harder to encourage good firms to bid and
to identify and exclude bad firms through fair means.
Where a contractor has breached the terms of the contract, the gov-
ernment must be sure to follow up using thorough and legal means.
To prevent a breach, the government should retain a sufficient per-
centage of the contract price so that it may leverage payments and
secure the proper attention of the contractor. 179 When a contractor
breaches his contracts with the government or is found guilty of crimi-
nal activities his company should be excluded from bidding for a pe-
riod of time.' 80 Such contractor exclusions, however, should only be
made when illegal acts have been proven.' 8'
While the needs are largely the same, the procurement of goods and
services in the public sector must be handled somewhat differently
than in the private sector. Private industry is largely free to do busi-
ness in the manner that best suits its interests. One such interest, es-
poused by modem management techniques, is the establishment of
long term business relationships between purchasers and suppliers.8 2
Such long standing relationships benefit the parties by focusing on
servicing one another's needs rather than staying within the bounda-
ries of the agreement. The key to these mutually beneficial relation-
ships is maximizing efficiencies for the greater whole, thereby
reducing costs and increasing profits.
The government may be interested in achieving these efficiencies
but must remain primarily concerned with its accountability to the
177. Ethics Reform, supra note 3, at 465-69.
178. Anecharico & Jacobs, supra note 111, at 165-66; see Ethics Reform, supra note
3, at 461. "All too often, the City is faced with a small number of 'niche' bidders,
firms whose expertise lies in threading their way through the city contracting maze
and who have adapted themselves to its peculiar and confounding logic." Id. at 472.
179. Sweet, supra note 20, § 26.03, at 569-71. Retainage creates security against
certain risks by holding back a percentage of earned progress payments. Federal pro-
curement policies, however, state that retainage must be for good cause. Id. at 570.
180. A contractor may be debarred or prohibited from the award of a contract
based on a violation of statute. Frank M. Alston et al., Contracting with the Federal
Government 461-62 (1984).
181. But see id. (describing debarment and suspension of contractors). A contrac-
tor may be suspended if the agency has reason to believe that he has committed a
seriously dishonest act.
182. W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis 35 (1982). An example of such are the
teachings of W. Edwards Deming, whose work is credited with improvements in qual-
ity and productivity in Japan. Id. at vii.
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people.183 Contract awards must be monitored by the public to pro-
tect against self-dealing.' The appearance of fairness that is
achieved by sealed bidding is a key aspect of how goods and services
are procured.1"s Although the sealed bidding process has some inher-
ent problems, it is still the best protection we have against corrupt
practices and should be continued.
III. EXISTING GovERNMENTI DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS
A dispute resolution procedure aims primarily to reach a correct
decision through a full and fair hearing of all of the facts. In the con-
tract realm, it is also desirable that such decisions be made swiftly and
efficiently. Unfortunately, meeting one aim of dispute resolution typi-
cally means compromising the others. A quick decision may not nec-
essarily explore all of the legal issues and provide due process. A full
and fair hearing through judicial processes may take years to reach its
final disposition. Moreover, given the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, the choice of how to settle disputes between government and
private contractors is placed in the hands of the government itself.
Given the vast number of states and municipalities contracting for
construction services, it is not surprising that a variety of dispute reso-
lution methods have been utilized. This part looks at some methods
utilized by various states and municipalities to resolve contract dis-
putes. It focuses on four systems that represent the range of systems
currently in place: the heavily government-biased systems used in
New York; the Maryland system influenced by the ABA Model Code
of Procurement; the federal system of Agency Boards of Standards
and Appeals; and the arbitration panels used in California. In particu-
lar, this part examines the degree of fairness provided by each of these
systems.
A. New York State-Engineer's Decisions and Non-Neutral Panels
Public contracting for construction services is particularly cumber-
some in New York State. First, there are numerous state, county, and
city agencies which independently contract for construction services.
Even agencies within the same city often work with different policies
and contracts. 86 Thus, contractors holding multiple city contracts
183. See Ethics Reform, supra note 3, at 464-65 (summarizing the recommenda-
tions of the New York State Commission on Government Integrity on the subject of
contracting processes in New York City driven by the need to fairly service the
taxpayer).
184. Id. at 480-82.
185. Id. at 482.
186. Robert J. MacPherson, In Your Face ADR New York City's Construction
Contract Dispute Procedure, 25 Pub. Cont. LU. 301, 306 (1996). Despite at least fif-
teen years of trying, agencies contracting for public works have been unable to agree
upon the same standard contract. As a result, contractors dealing with different city
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must become familiar with the particulars of a number of different
dispute resolution clauses. One of the most one sided dispute resolu-
tion processes-the engineer's decision clause-is used by several
New York governmental agencies.
With origins in the construction of railroads and other public works
during the early 1800s,187 engineer's decision clauses were seen as a
means of settling construction disputes between owners and contrac-
tors. Early engineer's decision clauses allowed an owner to name the
party who would decide a dispute.' s8 Despite the fact that an owner
would often choose a party that would favor himself, such clauses
were deemed by the courts to be fair under prevailing notions of free-
dom of contract. Although lacking a neutral arbitrator, such adjudica-
tion was looked upon as a type of arbitration. 189 This was despite the
contemporary availability of agreements that called for neutral party
arbitration. 90
One hundred and fifty years later, the modem-day engineer's deci-
sion clause is hardly different. Included in the standard contract of
many agencies, the clause now allows a contractor to bring disputes,
which could not be amicably resolved with the agency's contracting
officer, to the Chief Engineer, an employee of the agency. Because
the contract is the result of a sealed competitive bid, a contractor
stands little chance at having such clause deleted from the standard
agency contract.' 91
Contractors have challenged the one sided engineer's decision
clause as recently as this year in Yonkers Contracting Co. v. Port Au-
thority Trans-Hudson Corp. g'z In that case, Yonkers Contracting
("Yonkers") contended that certain project delays resulted directly
from Port Authority Trans-Hudson's ("PATH") misrepresentations of
the subsurface conditions. 93 After negotiations between Yonkers and
PATH proved unsuccessful, the issue was submitted for resolution to
PATH's Chief Engineer, as provided for by the contract's engineer's
decision clause. Anticipating the Chief Engineer's rejection of the
claim, Yonkers filed a claim with the court.' 95 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the New York Court of Appeals held the engineer's decision
departments must understand the specifics of each discrete department's contract in
submitting a bid.
187. See Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 12 Wend. 334 (N.Y. 1834).
188. See Jordan A. Dreifus, The "Engineer Decision" in California Public Contract
Law, 11 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1, 6 (1979).
189. Id
190. See, e.g., Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. 446 (1826); Underhill v. Van Cor-
tlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 339 (N.Y. 1817).
191. See supra, part II.C.
192. 663 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1996).
193. Id at 908.
194. Id
195. Id
1106 [Vol. 65
1996] FAIRNESS IN PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTING 1107
clause to be valid,196 citing its prior decision in Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,"9 which dealt with a similar
clause.
In Westinghouse, Westinghouse contracted with the New York City
Transit Authority ("TA") to provide and install power substation
equipment. 198 A dispute arose regarding delays and additional work.
As a result of this dispute, Westinghouse suspended performance, cit-
ing unresolved design issues on the part of the TA.199 The TA, in turn,
found Westinghouse to be in breach of contract.2"0 Westinghouse sub-
mitted its case to the TA's Chief Engineer, who rejected the claim.
Westinghouse then sued the TA for breach of contract, claiming that
the contract's Chief Engineer's clause 0 1 contravened public policy.202
The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected Westinghouse's conten-
tion, stating:
It is firmly established that the public policy of New York State fa-
vors and encourages arbitration and alternative dispute resolutions.
These mechanisms are 'well recognized as an effective and expedi-
tious means of resolving disputes between willing parties desirous of
avoiding the expense and delay frequently attendant to the judicial
process.' Thus, '[i]t has long been the policy of the law to interfere
as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties to
achieve that objective.' . . . Westinghouse chose, with its business
eyes open, to accept the terms, specifications and risk of the bid
contract, including the ADR clause.... To be sure, when powerful
municipalities put their public works jobs out for bid and require
196. Id. at 908-09.
197. 623 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1993).
198. Id. at 532.
199. Id. at 532-33.
200. Id. at 533.
201. The dispute resolution clause, Article 8.03 of the contract stated:
(a) In the event the Contractor and Authority are unable to resolve their
differences concerning a determination by the Superintendent, the Contrac-
tor may initiate a dispute in accordance with the procedure set forth in this
Article. Exhaustion of these procedures shall be a precondition to any law-
suit permitted hereunder.
(b) The parties to this contract authorize the Superintendent, acting person-
ally, to decide all questions of any nature whatsoever arising out of, under,
or in connection with, or in any way related to or on account of, this Con-
tract . . . and his decision shall be conclusive, final and binding on the
parties ....
(c) If the Contractor protests the determination of the Superintendent, the
Contractor may commence a lawsuit in a Court of competent jurisdiction of
the State of New York under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules or a United States Court in New York, under the procedures and
laws applicable in that court, it being understood the review of the Court
shall be limited to the question of whether or not the Superintendent's de-
termination is arbitrary, capricious or grossly erroneous to evidence bad
faith.
Id. at 532.
202. Id. at 533.
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competition, low cost and performance in accordance with pub-
lished specifications, they enjoy a virtual monopolistic-kind of
power. But that does not make those contracts adhesion
agreements.2 °3
The court further relied on the fact that the chief engineer's decision
was reviewable if it was "arbitrary, capricious or grossly erroneous to
evidence bad faith."2 4 Despite the non-neutral status of the adjudica-
tor, the court used the same standard for judicial review as that used
under arbitration.
The New York courts are not alone in upholding the enforceability
of non-neutral adjudication clauses. Federal and state courts have
typically upheld engineer's decision clauses.205 Most courts will over-
rule an engineer's decision only if it "is manifestly arbitrary or ren-
dered in bad faith. '20 6 If the clause is enforced, the engineer's
decision will likely be final. In order to find in favor of a contractor, a
Wyoming court, in a split decision, chose to interpret an engineer's
dispute clause as a limitation of actions clause rather than a finality
clause.20 7 Cases overruling the decision of an engineer appear to be
the exception rather than the rule.
Recently, New York City208 instituted a new method of settling pub-
lic agency construction disputes.20 9 As part of its new City Charter,
New York City reformed its dispute resolution system by instituting
the Procurement Policy Board ("PPB") system.21 0 The PPB aims to
"ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with
the procurement system of the City of New York. '211 Despite its at-
tempt to form a neutral alternative dispute resolution system, the PPB
has fallen short of this ideal.
When a contractor disagrees with the ruling of an agency head, the
PPB provides an opportunity to appeal. The PPB first requires that
the claim be submitted for review and investigation by the Comptrol-
ler's office. There, a contractor may resubmit the materials he gave
203. Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 532, 534-35.
205. United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 463 (1950); Zurn Eng'rs v. State, 138
Cal. Rptr. 478, 504 (Ct. Ap. 1977); see infra part III.C (describing the current federal
system, replacing engineers decision clauses with Boards of Contract Appeals).
206. J.H. Jenkins Contractor, Inc. v. City of Denham Springs, 216 So. 2d 549, 553
(La. Ct. App. 1968).
207. Brasel & Sims Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 688 P.2d 871, 876 (Wyo.
1984).
208. New York City spends more than $4 billion a year on capital construction.
MacPherson, supra note 186, at 309.
209. Disputes of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (of which New York City
Transit is a part), the NYC Board of Education, and the Health and Hospitals Corpo-
ration are not subject to the Procurement Policy Board. Constance Cushman, The
ABA Model Procurement Code: Implementation, Evolution, and Crisis of Survival, 25
Pub. Cont. L.J. 173, 179, n.26 (1996).
210. New York City Charter ch. 13, § 311.
211. New York City Rules & Regs., vol. 4, tit. 9, § 1-01(b)(5).
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the agency head. If the Comptroller fails to settle the claim, the
agency head's decision may be reviewed by the Contract Dispute Res-
olution Board panel ("CDRB"), whose members are specifically cho-
sen to hear the dispute. Comprised of two city officials (the City Chief
Procurement Officer and either the Director of the Office of Con-
struction or another City official with relevant experience) and one
neutral arbitrator,"1 the CDRB will review any "memoranda, briefs
and oral argument[s] '213 presented by the contractor, but no hearing
is held and no witnesses are heard.
Commentators agree that the PPB system is less than fair.214 By
appointing a panel specific to the dispute and having control over two
of the three adjudicators, city agencies retain the upper hand in adju-
dicating disputes with contractors. In addition to the lack of fairness
and due process, PPB procedures are slow. 215 Thus, the new proce-
dures clearly do not meet their stated purpose: they are neither neu-
tral nor expedient.
B. ABA Model Procurement Code and Maryland
Dispute resolution is one of the issues that the American Bar Asso-
ciation ("ABA") addressed in adopting the Model Procurement Code
for State and Local Governments ("M1'C"). 216 The ABA began con-
sideration of the MPC in 1970. Its original objectives were to elimi-
nate waste and corruption in government procurement.217 It soon
expanded its purpose, however, to include "ensur[ing] the fair and eq-
uitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement sys-
tem." 118 Specifically, Article 9 of the MPC deals with legal and
contractual remedies. Among the issues it addresses is how a contrac-
tor may appeal a chief procurement officer's decision.219
The ABA's coordinating committee set out to draft a model code
rather than a uniform code. 0 Because it is a model, states and mu-
nicipalities are free to adopt whatever parts make sense thereby en-
abling them to draft a code that meets their particular needs. Since its
adoption, MPC-based purchasing laws have been adopted by twenty-
212. MacPherson, supra note 186, at 305. The neutral arbitrator typically is se-
lected with contractor participation from a list kept by the city.
213. New York City Rules & Regs., voL 4, tit. 9, § 7-05(g)(2).
214. See MacPherson, supra note 186, at 301-02; see also Are the City's Contract
Resolution Procedures Fair?, 1 City L. 46 (1995) (noting that an arbitration panel
working under the PPB system favored New York City).
215. MacPherson, supra note 186, at 302 (citing a minimum of 300 days between
submission of a dispute to final disposition).
216. Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments (1980) [hereinaf-
ter MPC].
217. F. Trowbridge Vom Baur, A Personal History of the Model Procurement Code,
25 Pub. Cont. LJ. 149, 152-53 (1996).
218. MPC, supra note 216, § 1-101(2)(e).
219. Ia § 9-501.
220. Vom Baur, supra note 217, at 161-62.
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seven local jurisdictions and fifteen states.22 One of the more suc-
cessful examples of the MPC can be found in Maryland. 22
In 1980, the Maryland legislature enacted the "Procurement Arti-
cle," a set of procurement rules that essentially codified a version of
the ABA's MPC.223 The Procurement Article established a unified set
of rules for those who contract with the state, and replaced the rules
set by individual state agencies. Among the provisions of the Procure-
ment Article was a method of dispute resolution.224
At the heart of the Procurement Article was the establishment of
the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals ("MSBCA"). The
MSBCA was given jurisdiction over all contractual disputes involving
the state of Maryland, including bid protests raised by unsuccessful
bidders. Members of the three person MSBCA are appointed by the
Governor for a term of five years.225 Knowledgeable in public con-
struction,2 6 MSBCA members are unrelated to the agencies con-
tracting the work-making it a "neutral" forum.
According to Procurement Article procedures, the procurement of-
ficer makes an initial interpretation of the terms of the contract when
a contractor makes a claim. 2 7 Should the contractor disagree with
this determination, he may appeal to the upper levels of the agency
for review z28 Meanwhile, the contractor is obliged to continue with
the directed work. If the dispute remains unresolved after agency re-
view, the contractor may appeal the agency's decision to the
MSBCA.2 9 The MSBCA has jurisdiction to hear disputes over any
contractual issue, with powers to require parties to file briefs and al-
low discovery.230 Decisions by the MSBCA are reasoned, published
decisions afforded precedental value. MSBCA decisions may be ap-
pealed by either party to the Maryland appellate court.231
C. Federal System-Board of Standards and Appeals
The genesis of the federal system of contracting originated in war-
time military procurement.232 World War I saw an increase in pro-
221. Louis F. Del Duca et al., Annotations to the Model Procurement Code for
State and Local Governments with Analytical Summary of State Enactments at vii-x
(2d ed. 1992).
222. For an informative discussion of the procurement system in the State of Mary-
land, see Scott A. Livingston, Fair Treatment for Contractors Doing Business with the
State of Maryland, 15 U. Balt. L. Rev. 215 (1986).
223. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2661.
224. Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. §§ 15-215 to 223 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
225. Id § 15-207.
226. Id.
227. See id. § 15-218(b)(1).
228. Id. § 15-218(d).
229. Id. § 15-220(a).
230. Id. § 15-221(b)-(c).
231. See id § 15-223.
232. See Dreifus, supra note 188, at 25.
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curement by the War and Navy Departments. In response to the
resulting increased contract claims and disputes, the Secretary of War
created the War Department Board of Contract Adjustment. 33
While this department disbanded years after World War I, a similar
board, the War Department Board of Contract Appeals ("WDBCA"),
was created during World War II. The WDBCA was a part of the
War Department, reporting to the Secretary of War, but was in-
dependent from the division responsible for procurement.' - Deci-
sions of the WDBCA were treated as quasi-judicial and held firm and
conclusive on issues of law as well as fact,' absent fraud or gross
mistake by the WDBCA.
Reform of the federal system of construction contracting came as
the result of United States v. Wunderlich,-37 which established a partic-
ularly high standard of review for decisions by a non-impartial adjudi-
cator. In Wunderlich, Martin Wunderlich contracted with the
Department of the Interior to build a dam?-3 Wunderlich had a dis-
pute with the contracting official, which he appealed to the Secretary
of the Interior as required by the dispute clause of his contract.239 Af-
ter an unfavorable ruling from the Secretary of the Interior, Wunder-
lich sued in the Court of Claims.2 0 After the Court of Claims set
aside the Secretary of the Interior's decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.24'
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that a clause in federal
contracts providing for final decisions of disputes by a department
head should be enforced and that "[t]he decision of the department
head, absent fraudulent conduct, must stand under the plain meaning
of the contract."242 The Court rejected the Court of Claim's standard
of "'arbitrary,' 'capricious,' and 'grossly erroneous,"' and distin-
guished it from actions which implied bad faith.243 In his dissent, Jus-
233. IdL
234. Id. at 26-27.
235. Id.
236. United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 463 (1950).
237. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
238. Id. at 98.
239. The clause provided that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes con-
cerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the
contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days
to the head of the department concerned or his duly authorized representa-
tive, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto.
In the meantime, the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as
directed.
Id at 99, n.1.
240. See id at 98.
241. Id
242. Id at 100.
243. Id
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tice Douglas questioned the high standard set by the majority, noting
that:
The instant case reveals only a minor facet of the age-long struggle.
The result reached by the Court can be rationalized or made plausi-
ble by casting it in terms of contract law: the parties need not have
made this contract; those who contract with the Government must
turn square corners; the parties will be left where their engagement
brought them. And it may be that in this case the equities are with
the Government, not with the contractor. But the rule we announce
has wide application and a devastating effect. It makes a tyrant out
of every contracting officer. He is granted the power of a tyrant
even though he is stubborn, perverse or captious. He is allowed the
power of a tyrant though he is incompetent or negligent. He has the
power of life and death over a private business even though his de-
cision is grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected. 2 "
Limits are needed on the discretion given to government officials.
In response to the Wunderlich case, Congress enacted legislation re-
vising the method of dispute resolution in government contracting.
The "Wunderlich Act" provided that:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, re-
lating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of
any department or agency... shall contain a provision making final
a question of law the decision of any administrative official, repre-
sentative, or board. 245
As a result of this act, Boards of Contract Appeals were established
for most federal agencies.
Currently, disputes regarding federal construction contracts are
governed by the Contracts Dispute Act of 1978.246 The stated pur-
pose of the Act was to help "induce resolution of more contract dis-
putes by negotiation prior to litigation; equalize the bargaining power
of the parties when a dispute exists; provide alternate forums suitable
to handle the different types of disputes; and ensure fair and equitable
treatment to contractors and Government agencies. ''21 7 In order to
achieve this, the Act establishes a bifurcated system under which a
contractor may choose to bring a dispute of greater than $50,000
before an agency Board of Contract Appeals ("BCA") or to the
United States Court of Claims.4
244. IL at 101.
245. 68 Stat. 81 (1954) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1994)).
246. Pub. Law No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 601-13 (1994)).
247. Alston et al., supra note 180, at 446 (citing S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 1 (1978)).
248. 41 U.S.C. §§ 606, 609 (1994). If an agency does not have a large enough load
of appeals from contracting officer decisions to justify its own full-time BCA, a BCA
of another agency may be used to decide appeals. Id. § 607(c).
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An agency may establish a full-time BCA to decide appeals from
the decision of a contracting officer. 9 Although part of the agency,
the BCA is not related to a division that contracts out the work.
There are at least three BCA members on a board.50 Members must
have at least five years of experience in public contract law and serve
in the same manner as administrative judges." Procedures followed
by a BCA are prescribed by the Office of Federal Procurement Pol-
icy. 52 The appeals process is a fully adversarial process of discovery,
hearings, and written decisions- 53 The ruling of the BCA may be ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Claims for the Federal Circuit by either
the contractor or the agency. 4 While such an appeal of a ruling by a
BCA may be made, "apart from questions of fraud, determination of
the finality to be attached to a departmental decision on a question
arising under a 'disputes' clause must rest solely on consideration of
the record before the department." 5'
One may argue that, although it is not a participant in the construc-
tion project itself, the agency BCA is part of the agency and would,
therefore, be predisposed to rule for the agency. The contractor has
the option, however, of utilizing the Court of Claims instead of the
BCA. Given that such an option exists, the agency BCA has a vested
interest in maintaining at least the appearance of being a fair forum.
A contractor may be amenable to using the BCA rather than the
Court of Claims if he believes the BCA to be not only fair, but also a
quicker solution to the dispute. The average BCA decision is reached
within two to four years of its filing . 56 BCA decisions can be ap-
pealed to the Court of Claims for the Federal Circuit,2s5 where the
standard of review is whether "the decision is fraudulent, or arbitrary,
or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith,
or if such decision is not supported by substantial evidence." ' s
249. Id. § 607(a)(1) (1994).
250. Id
251. Id § 607(b)(1).
252. Alston et al, supra note 180, at 452-53 (citing the OFPP Final Rules of Proce-
dure for Boards of Contract Appeals Under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, June 14,
1979, Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,604).
253. Id at 454-56.
254. 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1)(A) (1994).
255. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714 (1963) (interpreting
the standard of judicial review under the Wunderlich Act). Given the quasi-judicial
nature of agency BCA's established by the Contract Dispute Act of 1978, it is clear
that present day appeals are not to be de novo reviews.
256. Maria R. Lamari, Note, The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Govern-
ment Construction Contract Disputes, 23 Hofstra L Rev. 205, 213 (1994) (citing find-
ings by Barbara Z. Korthals-Altes, The Applicability of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques to Government Defense Contract Disputes, May 1986, at 3, reprinted in
Administrative Conference of the United States, Sourcebook. Federal Agency Use of
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution 163 (1987)).
257. Pub. Law No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2387, § 8(g)(1)(A).
258. Id § 10(b).
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D. California-Arbitration Panels
In 1968, the case of Zurn Engineers v. State of California 9 raised
the issue of engineer's decision clauses in the state of California.260
Zurn concerned a contract with the state for construction of a dam.26'
The contract authorized the State Engineer to decide claims for addi-
tional compensation. Thus, Zurn filed a claim with the State Engineer
for $1.2 million of additional work. Zurn was awarded only
$127,000.262 According to the contract, the engineer's decision was
"[f]inal and conclusive unless it is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith. '263 Zurn
sued the State in Superior Court for breach of contract.264 The Supe-
rior Court ruled in favor of the contractor in the amount of
$896,000.265 The State of California appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals, where the court found that the State Engineer did
not provide the contractor sufficient due process,266 and returned the
case for reconsideration by the State Engineer.267 The court, how-
ever, upheld the engineer's decision clause, making such decision final
absent allegations of fraud or an arbitrary or capricious decision.268
As a result of the Zurn decision, the California Legislature passed a
law providing for neutral arbitration of all existing state construction
contracts.269 Further, an executive order was issued by Governor Ed-
mund G. Brown in 1978 that provided for an arbitration clause in all
state construction contracts.27 ° Although the Zurn case settled the
law in favor of the engineer's decision clauses in California, the legis-
lature and Governor rendered the decision moot.271
259. 138 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
260. For a thorough discussion of Zurn and the cases which led up to it, see Dreifus,
supra note 188, at 1-18.
261. Zurn, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
262. Id. at 485.
263. Id. at 480.
264. California's state and local governments have never been covered under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Dreifus, supra note 188 at 84-5.
265. Zurn, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
266. Id. at 501.
267. Id. at 504.
268. Id at 494.
269. "Any dispute arising from a construction contract with a public agency, which
contract contains a provision that one party ... shall decide any disputes arising under
that contract, shall be resolved by submitting the dispute to independent arbitration,
if mutually agreeable, otherwise by litigation in a court of competent jurisdiction."
Cal. Civ. Code § 1670 (West 1995).
270. Dreifus, supra note 188, at 96 (Exec. Order B 50-78, dated Dec. 8, 1978).
271. Curiously, the changes made in the wake of Zurn did not ultimately benefit
the contractor in the case. In the follow-up case of Pascal & Ludwig, Inc. v. State, 179
Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), the contractor sought to make use of the new
arbitration legislation rather than gain a rehearing with the State Engineer. Id. at 404.
Alternatively, the contractor argued that the engineer's decision clause should not be
enforced because it was a contract of adhesion and contrary to public policy. Id. at
408. On the issue of arbitration, the court upheld a trial court ruling that the contrac-
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The current California system is codified at section 10240 of the
California Public Contract Code. Under this Code, agency contracts
provide for arbitration of disputes in front of a seven member arbitra-
tion committee. Three of the committee members are appointed by
272the Governor, one member is appointed by each of the three major
government agencies that contract for construction work (Department
of General Services, Transportation, and Water Resources),' and
one non-voting member is appointed (Director of the Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearing).274 The members appointed by the Governor
must have experience working for a general contracting firm.2 5
Therefore, the composition of the arbitration board is evenly balanced
between potentially pro-agency and pro-contractor voting members.
Because the arbitration board may only rule on issues involving mon-
etary damages, the court system is potentially available where other
remedies are sought by the parties.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Public works projects account for a major portion of government
budgets at the federal, state, and municipal level. With great amounts
of tax revenue at stake, governments seek to prevent corruption, mini-
mize construction costs, and generally provide a fair deal for the tax-
payer. These policies, however, place contractors at a major
disadvantage and are often unfair. Many contractors choose to avoid
government projects.276 As a result, competition is reduced and prices
are higher.277 Those contractors that remain are often those who have
mastered the bureaucracy.278 The less fortunate become the system's
victims.
This part looks at the inequities of public works contracting, show-
ing how the system is unfair to contractors. It continues by discussing
sealed competitive bidding, arguing for its continued use despite its
flaws. Finally, this part proposes reforms to the public works procure-
tor had been given an adequate legal remedy by being given a rehearing with the
State Engineer and that, therefore, arbitration was not available to the contractor. Id.
at 409. The court also rejected the contractor's contention that its subsequent ruling
in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (standardized contract where
one party has superior bargaining power may be considered a contract of adhesion
and be held unenforceable) should be applied in this case. 179 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
272. Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 10245(a) (West 1985). Originally, the three Governor
appointees were construction industry persons appointed by the Associated General
Contractors of California. Dreifus, supra note 188, at 101 (Executive Order B 50-78,
item 4, Dec. 8, 1978).
273. Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 10245(a) (West 1985).
274. Id. § 10245(c) (West 1985).
275. Id. § 10245(a) (West 1985).
276. Ethics Reform, supra note 3, at 470-72 (New York State Commission on Gov-
ernment Integrity report citing a lack of bidders for city contracts).
277. Id. at 474-77 (noting higher prices as a result of the lack of competition).
278. Id at 472.
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ment system, focusing on ways to prevent disputes and, if needed, set-
tle disputes fairly.
A. Inequities of Public Works Contracting
Design and construction of building projects can be quite long and
complicated. 79 The multiple promises that make up a construction
contract are intricately intertwined, making modification to the con-
tract difficult. In addition, construction provides many opportunities
for change orders subsequent to the award of a contract."s The diver-
gent interests of an owner in getting the most product for his money,
and the contractor in minimizing expenditures on a fixed fee, make
construction disputes inevitable. Public works projects cause particu-
lar problems because of the inequitable position taken by the govern-
ment in bidding projects and in settling disputes.
Competitive sealed bidding procedures that predominate in govern-
ment procurement have inherently adhesionary characteristics. 28' By
reducing competition to the single variable of price, terms and condi-
tions of a bid are essentially non-negotiable. This process also allows
the government to unfairly allocate risks to the contractor, particu-
larly risks that are not under the contractor's control3m This risk allo-
cation is particularly unfair because the competitive bidding system
coerces contractors to undervalue risk. Under this scenario, the gov-
ernment may take more risks than is desirable because it is not forced
to internalize those costs.
Adding to the government's advantage is its superior position in
dispute resolution that originated in the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.-83 The sovereign nature of government makes suing the govern-
ment only possible with its permission. Although this immunity has
been waived to various degrees, government has typically reserved the
upper hand in dispute resolution by drafting contracts that specify
methods of dispute resolution that are not always fully neutral. In
addition, many of the day-to-day decisions on a project that affect the
scope and interpretation of a contract are made by an architect. Gov-
ernment agencies often use in-house architects, creating a direct con-
flict when these architects are forced to make discretionary decisions
regarding the rights of a contractor as against the government
owner. 2
4
279. See supra parts I.B, I.C.
280. See supra part I.E.
281. See supra part II.C.1.
282. See supra part II.C.2.
283. See supra part II.E.
284. See supra part II.D.
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B. Sealed Competitive Bidding
Sealed competitive bidding creates many problems, which grow out
of the adhesionary aspects it creates in public works contracts.' It is
a complex process that requires strict procedures and bureaucracy.
Assuming that both are considered qualified, a company with a bad or
mediocre history is given the opportunity to compete on the same ba-
sis as a company with a track record of satisfactory performance with
an agency. The value of sealed competitive bidding, however, does
not lie in the good it does but in the bad it prevents.
Sealed competitive bidding affords the opportunity for public scru-
tiny and makes it more difficult for corruption in the award process.
Because of the large sums of money involved, bid determinations left
to subjective discretionary factors would present too great an opportu-
nity for influence peddling. The process is also benefited by enlist-
ment of unsuccessful bidders acting as watchdogs.
C. A Proposal
Our system of public works contracting leaves much room for im-
provement. Rather than looking to secure the upper hand for the
government, procurement policies need to focus on increasing compe-
tition by attracting competent and reputable companies to do business
with the government. The best way to achieve this goal is to make the
system completely fair. Nowhere is fairness put more to the test than
in the realm of dispute resolution.
The following proposal attacks the lack of fairness in dispute resolu-
tion on two levels. On one level, we can enhance fairness by prevent-
ing conflict. By being more precise about what is being purchased,
both the government and the contractor can better define the contrac-
tual relationship, as well as properly allocate risk between the parties.
On another level, fairness will be enhanced if neutral fora for dispute
resolution are offered. Full and fair methods of dispute resolution will
place the government and contractor on even bargaining positions,
making it more likely that disputes will be settled on a mutually-agree-
able, negotiated basis.
1. Preventing Disputes
The primary source of dispute in construction is change orders.
While it is impractical to think that change orders can be totally elimi-
nated, there are many ways in which they may be reduced. As the
owner, the government controls many sources of potential dispute.
Therefore, government agencies that contract for public works should
take a proactive role in preventing disputes.
285. See supra part IT.C.
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The scope of work included in a project should be defined with an
eye towards specificity. If the type or design of a system is important,
it must be designed and detailed to enable the contractor to be sure of
what exactly he is bidding. Even if there are subsequent changes, it is
best to establish at the outset a firm basis from which adjustments may
be made.
Clauses that seek to allocate risks to the contractor should not be
used in a competitive bid situation. Unlike costs for materials and
labor that can be calculated on the basis of numerical quantities and
methods of construction, risk is a component of the bid that must be
assessed on a subjective basis; in fact, owners seek to minimize the
appearance of risk in order to obtain favorable prices. Because the
cost associated with risk is embedded in the price offered in the bid,
sealed bid competition rewards those who undervalue the true cost of
such risk to the detriment of those who attempt to accurately assess
the risk. Once signed, the owner uses the contract to enforce the risk
allocation as it is established in the agreement.
Elements of risk not under the contractor's control should be re-
moved from competitively bid public contracts. The government
should pay for all contingent conditions when and if they are encoun-
tered. The first means of removing the risk is eliminating the possibil-
ity that a contingent condition will arise in the first place. During the
design phase, government projects should involve more exploration of
field conditions so that the contractor's bid can better reflect actual
conditions.
Where information on a given condition is available, it should be-
come the objective basis of the bid. For example, when boring logs
show bedrock at a given depth, the contractor should be able to rely
on this information in his bid. Where adjustments can be reasonably
expected, provisions for modifying the contract should be made a part
of the bid price. For example, unit prices should be used for adjusting
the price based on the condition actually encountered. Where alter-
nate scenarios may be envisioned, prices for those conditions should
also be solicited within the bid.
Despite all of this, an owner may still want to eliminate the
problems of risk. This can be achieved through capital planning which
can provide some measure of guarantee in order to assure that suffi-
cient funds have been allocated. This can be achieved by paying a
fixed up-front cost. Though it is here argued that contractors are not
capable of taking on this risk, it should be possible to find a third party
who is both willing and capable of doing so-this, in fact, is the whole
concept behind insurance.
Insurance could be purchased on a project-by-project basis. Since
the amount of risk will vary with the precautions taken, diligence in
investigating conditions may be rewarded in the form of reduced pre-
miums. Because the premium is not masked by the price of goods and
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services, and because the carrier is taking on the risk voluntarily, the
owner ends up paying the true cost of such risk.
2. Settling Disputes Fairly
Even with good faith and reasonable planning by both parties in the
bidding phase, disputes will inevitably arise. Since a dispute over one
aspect of a project may affect other aspects, such as time and
money,2 6 dispute resolution in construction really has two compo-
nents-initial rulings and final dispositions. In both cases, public
works contracting is problematic. If the ultimate means of resolving
the dispute is fair and impartial, however, the initial ruling is less criti-
cal. Therefore, government agencies should adopt a policy of negoti-
ated dispute settlement backed by a full and fair adjudication before a
neutral party.
An architect paid by the government or, in the case of many public
agencies, a direct government employee, cannot be neutral toward the
owner. In fact, the dispute that the architect is charged with settling
may have in fact been caused by an error or omission by the architect
herself. Nonetheless, it is important that someone intimately familiar
with the project be empowered to make preliminary rulings in order
to allow construction to proceed without delay. Short of hiring a neu-
tral party to be on hand in anticipation of disputes, the architect is in
the best position to make an initial ruling. A wrong ruling may be
corrected afterwards so that one party is not unfairly enriched. If no
ruling were made until a neutral party could sit and hear all of the
facts, delays to the project would hurt all parties.
The only way to assure fair disposition of a dispute is to offer final
adjudication of the issue by a neutral party. Engineer's decisions
clauses clearly do not meet this benchmark, because an employee of
the government agency involved in the dispute is ruling on the dis-
pute, and could not be considered neutral. Such a decision could eas-
ily favor the agency without violating the arbitrary, capricious, or bad
faith standard used by the court in granting judicial review. Panels
which are primarily chosen by the agency, such as New York City's
PPD, are also non-neutral.
Adjudication by a court, an option under the federal system, would
offer the best chance of achieving fairness. It would provide full due
process in an adversarial proceeding and produce a reasoned, written
decision. While the judge would be knowledgeable in the law, she
may lack knowledge in construction practices. In addition, relying on
the courts for the adjudication of public works construction cases
would add to the huge backlog of cases already handled by our courts.
Additionally, time becomes a factor that militates against a fair result.
286. See supra part I.A.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Cash-strapped contractor plaintiffs may be forced to settle or may not
survive long enough to see their cases heard.
Of the forums currently used by the government in public works
dispute resolutions, the ABA, federal agency BCA, and California ar-
bitration panel models each offer some promising aspects that would
make them appropriate for particular situations. In each of these
cases, board members are full-time members chosen based on an ex-
pertise in construction practices. That full-time members are chosen
for a term of years, rather than for the particular conflict as in the
New York City PPD, provides continuity; also, these members need
not fear that their jobs depend upon the result of their decision. Each
of these boards offers the possibility for precedential value through
the use of reasoned written opinions.
Of these boards, the ABA model provides the most neutral forum
because its board has no ties to the agency involved in the disputes. In
contrast, the BCA under the federal system is actually a part of the
agency. As a check, however, the contractor could elect to have his
dispute heard in the Court of Claims. Under the California system,
three of the six voting members are appointed by the agencies most
likely to be parties to a public works construction dispute. Although
the other three members appointed by the Governor would seem to
present a balance for the contractor, the Governor is not bound to
nominate contractor-friendly board members. As a result, the Cali-
fornia arbitration board may be neutral, but is not necessarily so.
Because some municipalities may not have the volume of decisions
to merit setting up their own board, states should make their boards
accessible to local governments. Small towns or counties should also
consider using neutral party arbitration, favored by private construc-
tion parties. The Arbitration Association of America has a construc-
tion division, which has formal rules particular to the construction
industry. The use of arbitration in construction disputes has a long
and successful history. Panels of neutral arbitrators may include for-
mer judges and construction industry personnel. Although the arbi-
tration process does not lead to the development of case law, it can be
significantly cheaper and result in swifter justice.
Agencies should adopt a policy that promotes amicable dispute res-
olution through good faith negotiation. Having a fair and neutral fo-
rum available to resolve disputes not only helps assure that the correct
result is obtained, but also eliminates unfair bargaining positions. A
negotiated settlement saves both parties resources in reaching an ad-
judicated settlement.
CONCLUSION
Fairness in governmental construction contracting is both a worthy
goal and beneficial to taxpayers. Unfortunately, complete fairness in
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government contracting is the exception rather than the rule.
Although sovereign immunity granted government superior position
in dealing with contractors, public agencies ceded some of this power
to make this relationship more equitable. At the same time, courts
have consistently allowed governments to dictate the terms of con-
struction agreements. The combination of such standardized agree-
ments and sealed bid, competitive bidding have made for less than
completely fair results.
Despite judicial rulings that enforce unfair bargains such as those
that included engineer's decision clauses, there are indications that
change is afoot. Legislatures have come to embrace some of the sug-
gestions that the ABA proposed in its Model Code for Procurement.
This Note endorses reform of procurement procedures in the con-
struction services industry and suggests that changes should be ad-
dressed at multiple levels.
One of the hidden factors of unfairness is the allocation of risk. By
placing risk in the hands of competitive bid contractors, agencies re-
ward those who disregard or undervalue risk. This Note suggests that
agencies should minimize risk by exploring hidden conditions before
bidding drafting contingencies into bid documents. Where an agency
is unwilling to take on the cost of unforeseen conditions, it should
contract with third parties that are better equipped to insure against
such risk.
Fmally, a fair means of final adjudication must be in place for in-
stances when disputes inevitably arise. The use of neutral parties in
such adjudication is necessary not only to achieve a fair result, but to
equalize bargaining power so that both sides have incentives to nego-
tiate a settlement in good faith.
One could argue that contracting officers in public agencies should
be given discretion in dealing with bad contractors who win contracts
through public bidding. There will always be those who abuse the sys-
tem. Engineering decision clauses and other non-neutral adjudication
systems provide such discretion. But the dangers in these procedures
outweigh their advantages. Though the vast majority of those work-
ing in the public sector look out for the public good, unfair dispute
resolution provisions create the potential for abuse. Proper legal
channels must be used to curb contractor abuses. "Cutting comers"
on due process is not the answer.
When dealing with the government, those of us who have faith in
our legal system ultimately believe that we should be treated fairly.
Those who have not be treated fairly will avoid dealing with the gov-
ernment. Such has been the case with governmental construction con-
tracting. Though forces of change continue to act, there is much work
to be done. By earning the trust of those who contract with the gov-
ernment, we all stand to gain.

